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This thesis constitutes an attempt to better comprehend and understand the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) effort to consolidate territory it believed rightfully belonged to China and its implications 
moving forward.   China is a fascinating, complicated and confusing country.  It is the most populated 
country in the world with 1,349,585,8381 people, 91.5% of whom are ethnic Han Chinese.  The 
remaining 8.5% of the population is split amongst 55 ethnic minorities.2  While 8.5% may seem like a 
small number, 8.5% of 1,349,585,838 is just under 115 million people.  That is over one-third of the 
population of the United States. If the 55 minorities were to be considered their own country they 
would be the thirteenth most populated country in the world.3  Most of the minority population lives on 
China’s periphery and were incorporated into China by the expansionistic Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).  
Typically they do not speak Mandarin, the official state language of the PRC.  In this regard ironically 
roughly 400 million PRC citizens do not speak Mandarin either and millions of others speak it poorly.4  
Millions of Han Chinese speak one of the over 1,500 dialects of Chinese, most notably Yue (Cantonese), 
Wu (Shanghaineese), Minbei (Fuzhou), Minna (Hokkien-Taiwanese) along with the Xiang, Gan and Hakka 
dialects.  Beijing seeks to unify the citizens of the PRC through Mandarin. 
 China’s administrative structure is especially complicated: It had twenty-two provinces (with 
Taiwan being twenty-third), five autonomous regions (Guangxi, Nei Mongol or Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang Uygur, Xizang or Tibet), two special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau), four 
municipalities (Shanghai, Beijing, Chongqing, and Tianjin), and several special economic zones.  The 
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PRC’s attempt to consolidate control over certain regions, most notably Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, 
Macau, and Taiwan, has drawn a tremendous amount of criticism from the international community.  
This thesis is a report on the PRC attempt to consolidate control over those territories as well as protect 
China’s borders externally.   I begin by first discussing how the century of humiliation (1839-1949) 
contributed to the rise of contemporary Chinese nationalism, and the desire to create a Chinese-led 
state.  It would leave a haunting suspicion of treaties and a fear of the world preventing China from 
claiming its rightful place in East Asia.  Most importantly, the events of the century of humiliation 
created a preeminence of Chinese political thought on the importance of territory.   
The century of humiliation ended on October 1, 1949 with the creation of the PRC and Chairman 
Mao Zedong famously exclaiming, “The Chinese people have stood up.” Following the creation of this 
new state, China still had much land it needed to consolidate.  I first discuss instances where the PRC has 
gone to war over territorial disputes since 1949.  This includes a 1962 war with India, a 1969 war with 
the USSR, and a 1979 war with Vietnam.  Also included is the 1950-1953 Korean War with the United 
States because although it was not fought over contested territory, China entered the war to protect its 
own boundaries.  Through this study of external conflicts we witness that the PRC has always been the 
first to engage in conflicts, through the principles Henry Kissinger calls “offensive deterrence” or 
“preemptive deterrence.”5 
After examining China’s defense of its external boundaries, this thesis turns to China’s attempts 
to consolidate its interior.  This includes the disputed territorial claims of Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and 
Macau and Taiwan.  Within each region I discuss China’s attempt to consolidate control over the 
territory along with local resistance to PRC rule, including local nationalism.  Finally this thesis examines 
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China’s territorial claims to the South and East China Seas that are disputed by other states and sources 
for regional tension.   
The CCP’s quest to consolidate territory is not a new phenomenon in Chinese history.  
Traditional Chinese culture dates back thousands of years to its roots along the banks of the Yellow River 
under the legendary Yellow Emperor.  The civilization gradually spread outwards as Dynasties ruled over 
the Chinese civilization, rising and falling through what has been labeled the Dynastic Cycle.  Rulers 
would unite the Chinese people, found a dynasty and gain the mandate of heaven to rule.  Eventually 
the dynasty would lose the mandate of heaven when the internal Chinese system broke down.  The 
bloodiest conflicts throughout Chinese history always occurred as a result of the breakdown of the 
internal Chinese system, thus for Chinese political leaders domestic stability and protection from foreign 
invaders have been of equal concern.6  Then in the midst of this internal chaos, another ruler would 
overthrow the ruling dynasty and unite the people by consolidating both power and territory; providing 
a new dynasty that would claim the mandate of heaven and repeat the dynastic cycle. 
The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a famous 14th century Chinese epic-novel, begins and ends 
with this continuous rhyme: “The empire, long divided, must unite: long united, must divide.  Thus it has 
ever been.”7  China’s first unifier is said to be Emperor Qin Shi Huang, the Qin Emperor.  In 221 BC ended 
the Warring States period (475-221 BC) by conquering the other Chinese states and founded the Qin 
Dynasty (221-206 BC).  Despite its brief reign, the Qin has a tremendous historical impact for unifying 
the Chinese people and consolidating the Chinese territory under one political system.  This established 
the precedent for maintaining and striving for the ideals of a united “China.”  Naturally from this dynasty 
we derive the name “China.”  The Qin Emperor also contributed to modern China by helping to begin 
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construction of the Great Wall of China; his mausoleum is visited by millions of tourists every year who 
travel to Xi’an to see the terracotta warriors. 
In 206 BC Han Dynasty overthrew the Qin Dynasty and ruled China as a unified state for most of 
the years from 206 BC-220 AD.  Following the overthrow of the Han Dynasty, China was again 
fragmented during the Six Dynasties period (220-618) before becoming unified by the Tang Dynasty 
(618-906).  This period in between the Han and Tang Dynasties featured widespread disorder.  In China 
periods lacking a centralized state are considered abnormal and transitional, due to the Han’s successful 
four hundred year stint ruling China as a centralized state that established the political norm.8  Since 
then China has been more or less unified under the Song (960-1279), Yuan (1279-1368), Ming (1368-
1644) and Qing Dynasties (1644-1912).  Although many say that China’s dynastic period is over, it can be 
said that the current regime rules as the Communist, or Mao Dynasty.  Chinese dynasties were not 
always ruled by Han Chinese themselves; sometimes they were ruled by foreign conquerors such as the 
Mongolian Yuan and the Manchurian Qing Dynasties.  Unification of the Chinese people and its territory 
is applauded by Chinese historians, and always arose as a result of a strong ruler consolidating the 
territories of the previous dynasties.   Unity and disunity of people and territory are themes of Chinese 
history.  This may be best summed up by the words of Chinese official Liu Ji in 2004: 
The unification of China is a matter beyond dispute and bargaining.  Anyone with a little 
knowledge of Chinese culture knows that unification has been an essential tradition and 
the basis for natural establishment throughout Chinese history.  Chinese history is a 
history of fighting disunity and reinforcing unity.  Any person or political group that 
maintains Chinese unification and territorial integrity wins the people’s support and the 
appreciation of historians.  Any person or political group that tries to divide China, to 
surrender will be cast aside by the people and condemned from generation to 
generation.9 
 This study of the PRC’s geographic consolidation of territory does not take place in a political or 
cultural vacuum.  There are larger, complex issues at stake here.  First what are the borders of China?  
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Are Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan considered within the borders of China or outside it?  
Are the criteria for defining the borders of “China” politically based upon the territory that the PRC 
claims, the territory within the current PRC, or the territory fully administered by the CCP?  If it is based 
strictly upon the territory within the PRC, then Taiwan is outside the border.  If we base it upon the 
territory fully administered by the CCP then Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are outside the borders.  Or 
are the borders of China better defined by ethnic and linguistic boundaries than strict political borders?  
Attempting to determine the borders of China means attempting to understand what it means to be 
“Chinese” and to what degree Chinese identity is determined along ethnic, linguistic, religious, historical, 
political and geographical lines.  Traditionally reading and writing the Chinese script (but not necessarily 
speaking whatever language was at Court) was essential component to be included into the Chinese 
political state.  Whoever mastered the written Chinese language were inside, and those who could not 
were outside.10  Culture and the state have always been linked, causing Lucian Pye in 1992 to asset that 
China is a “civilization pretending to be a nation-state.” 
 Second, what changes will come with respect to Chinese domestic politics as a result of its quest 
for consolidating territory?  Will more human rights be bestowed on Chinese citizens due to the 
pressure to meeting existing international norms?  Will China’s attempt to court Taiwan lead the PRC 
towards more free-market capitalism and democracy?  Will Beijing move more towards the Hong Kong 
or Taiwan model?  Both Hong Kong and Taiwan have become highly functioning economies and Taiwan 
has evolved into a successful democracy.  These societies offer models that threaten the current 
method of governance used by the CCP.  Most notably, Beijing has always claimed it must rule as it does 
for stability, and that democracy would never work in China.  However it is currently working on Taiwan. 
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 Building on the previous question, what is the CCP’s current ideology and the basis of its 
legitimacy to exercise power?  Although it is communist in name, the Chinese Communist Party is no 
longer united by Maoist and communist ideology.  Mao Zedong’s ideological policies to rapidly 
transform China during the Great Leap Forward (1985-1961) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
resulted in the deaths of millions of Chinese.  Following his death in 1976, China has shifted away from 
Maoist policies under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping.  In 1979 he opened up China to foreign 
investment, seeking a more practical policy to increase China’s standard of living.  This coincided with 
the opening of four Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, Zuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) along the 
Southeastern coast near Hong Kong and Taiwan to experiment with free-market capitalism by attracting 
overseas Chinese investment.11  In 1984 the model was determined to be successful and Beijing opened 
up fourteen coastal cities to foreign direct investment (FDI).  In 1988 Hainan province would become the 
fifth SEZ.  Since then Beijing has extended many of these economic policies to inland cities to attract 
foreign investment there. Deng Xiaoping’s practical transition away from communism was best 
described by his quote: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.”  Clearly 
the CCP’s political ideology is no longer Maoist communism, although it would be correctly labeled as 
socialist. 
 Beijing’s drive to consolidate China’s territory also has important implications for the 
international community.  It has driven many to perceive China to be an aggressive state.  But is this the 
correct depiction, and is Chinese nationalism aggressive?  Does China’s tenacity to consolidate territory 
mean that Chinese nationalism is expansionistic?  Recently on February 5, 2014 Benigno Aquino, the 
President of the Philippines, criticized the West for not confronting China over its voiced territorial 





ambitions, and compared contemporary China to Hitler’s Nazi Germany.12  On February 19, 2014 reports 
were released that US Naval intelligence analysts have determined that China is preparing its military for 
a “short, sharp war” with Japan over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese).13  Most of the 
international community’s fear of China’s territorial ambitions center on the existing disputes with other 
Asian states over offshore islands within the South and East China Seas.  This tour of Beijing’s attempt to 
consolidate its territorial claims will help determine whether the international community should be 
fearful of China’s growing power and influence.   
 Much has been written about fear of a “rising China.”  China’s policymakers are however very 
conscious of how their actions as power rising within the international system can create tension and 
seek to avoid such.  As Hu Jintao stated, China wants a “peaceful rise.”  In 2004 the State Council 
Information Office head Zhao Qizheng elaborated on this slogan by explaining that “the ‘peaceful’ is for 
foreigners, the ‘rise for us.”14  From 2003 to 2006 Chinese academics studied the rise and fall of other 
great powers throughout history, which was eventually aired into a twelve-part film series aired on 
Chinese national television, entitled The Rise of Great Powers.15  Special attention was paid to 
Germany’s rise and fall up to World War I, Japan and Germany leading up to World War II, and the fall of 
the Soviet Union.  From these studies China learned that it must seek a new international order by 
integrating with the current order through incremental reforms and democratic international relations.  
It cannot pursue a militarized path to hegemony and resource security as Germany and Japan did, nor 
can it compete with the US militarily and vye for global domination as the USSR did during the Cold War.   
China seeks to learn from Otto von Bismarck’s management of Germany’s rise and unification in the 
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19th century and take a prudent and accommodating approach to its neighbors.16  However, despite 
Bismarck’s skillful diplomacy in managing Germany’s rise and unification in the 19th century, Germany 
would seemingly become the aggressor in two world wars in the 20th century.   
From Beijing’s mind this is a “returning China,” a China on track to reclaim its rightful place as 
the preeminent power in East Asia.  After all, the Chinese name for China is zhongguo, translated to 
English as “middle kingdom.”  Traditionally China behaved in a fashion fitting towards its name, and 
perceived itself to be at the center of the world.  According to Odd Arne Westad justice, rules and 
centrality are important aspects of the Chinese mindset to keep in mind when observing Chinese foreign 
policy of the past, present and future.17  From the Chinese viewpoint the world has treated China 
unjustly and prevented it from reclaiming what it believes to be its rightful position as a respected 
power at the center of East Asian affairs.  The PRC’s efforts to consolidate territory it believed rightfully 
belonged to China is important to understand because it provides insight to whether China is an 
aggressive state that should be feared by the international community. 
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Century of Humiliation:  
A study of China’s territorial consolidation would be incomplete without first discussing China’s 
haunting memory of the “century of humiliation.”  This period generally describes the period of political 
upheaval and chaos in China beginning with the First Opium War in 1839 and ending on October 1, 1949 
with the founding of the People’s Republic of China.  On this date Mao famously exclaimed that the 
“Chinese people have stood up,” effectively stating that their century of national humiliation had ended.  
During this time China endured several wars with foreign powers, multiple domestic rebellions and the 
protracted Civil War that ended with a Communist victory.  During the century of humiliation China 
would lose much of its territory through a series of “unequal treaties.”  The amount of treaties that were 
unequal are unknown, but they generally describe several treaties that culminated in China paying war 
amenities, opening up ports for trade, conceding territory to foreign powers, and allowing for the 
extraterritoriality for foreigners.  From China’s perspective they were unequal because they were used 
to take advantage of China’s weakness, and were not the outcome of nations negotiating as equals.  
Today Chinese diplomats have an inherent mistrust of treaties due to the memory of unequal treaties 
during the century of humiliation. Throughout the century of humiliation, China would be at the whim of 
the imperial motives of Great Powers as they lost much of their sovereign territory to unequal treaties 
that were based in international law.  In addition, throughout the century China would be in a constant 
state of domestic upheaval as several nationalistic rebellions attempted to overthrow the Qing Dynasty.  
In 1911 the Revolutionary Alliance would succeed under the guidance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.  China 
remembers the century of humiliation as a time of national humiliation during which the Chinese nation 
was victimized and abused.  This education is taught throughout Chinese classrooms. 
 The century of humiliation began with the First Opium War (1839-1842) between Great Britain 
and China.  The tension of the war began when in 1838 after Emperor Daoguang outlawed the opium 
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trade.  This was done to stop the rising Chinese opium addiction and the social problems it was causing.  
He ordered Lin Zexu to enforce the ban and by mid-1839 he had arrested over 1,600 Chinese, seized 
about 50,000 pounds of opium and confiscated over 70,000 opium pipes.18  He also convinced the 
foreigners living in Canton to handover 20,000 chests of opium and would up sending roughly 3 million 
pounds of opium to the sea.  The destruction of British property led the two nations to war in the fall of 
1839.  The Chinese naval forces were no match for the Royal Navy.  Before England could destroy the 
Nanjing, a former capital city during the Ming Dynasty, China sued for peace.  On August 29, 1842, the 
Treaty of Nanjing would be signed, the first of many unequal treaties.  The treaty called for China to pay 
Mex$6 million for the destruction of British opium, ceded Hong Kong to the Queen in perpetuity, and 
opened up five cities (Canton, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai) for British trade and residence.  
The opening up of Shanghai would change China forever as this began Shanghai’s current status as an 
international city with many “concession” areas being granted to foreign settlements.  The next year the 
British negotiated for “most-favored nation status” and the principle of “extraterritoriality” for its 
subjects with the Treaty of the Bogue.  Extraterritoriality would come to be despised by the Chinese as a 
violation of their sovereignty.  Following the British agreement, the Americans (Treaty of Wanghia) and 
the French (Treaty of Whampoa) would arrange their own treaties to secure for their citizens the right 
to trade in those ports and be granted extraterritoriality.   
 The next major event during the century of humiliation would be the Taiping Rebellion, a 
domestic upheaval which involved much of China from 1850-1864.  This was a rebellion primarily against 
the current state of the Qing, leading future Nationalistic Chinese leaders Sun-Yet Sun and Mao Zedong 
to praise the Taiping rebels for their anti-Manchu and anti-foreign spirit.19  Both leaders viewed Hong 
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Xiuquan, the leader of the Taiping, as their predecessor in the Chinese revolutionary movement.20  Hong 
Xiuquan, a radical Christian convert, believed himself to be the younger brother of Jesus Christ.  By 1850 
his recruits passed the 20,000 mark as he gathered his rebellion around the Thistle Mountain area in the 
Southeastern province of Guangxi.21  In one attempt to gain recruits the Taiping exclaimed: “Can the 
Chinese still consider themselves men?  Ever since the Manchus poisoned China, the flame of 
oppression has risen up to heaven, the poison of corruption has defiled the emperor’s throne, the 
offensive odor has spread over the four seas, and the influence of demons has distressed the empire 
while the Chinese with bowed heads and dejected spirits willing became subject and servants.”22   
From Thistle Mountain they marched north and by 1853 the Taiping seized Nanjing. From 1853-
1864 Hong would run the Heavenly Kingdom of Peace from here, with himself as the Heavenly King.  The 
Taiping would rule with a very radical form of Christianity that held an ascetic ban on alcohol, opium 
smoking and prostitution.  In 1864 the Qing would finally lay the rebellion to rest with the assistance of 
western troops.  They failed to overthrow the Qing due to their radicalism for which most citizens in 
Nanjing resented their rule.  Also, the Western powers allied with the Qing in fighting the rebellion to 
prevent the Taiping from destroying Shanghai.  The Taiping Rebellion helped sow the seeds for future 
anti-Qing and anti-foreign nationalistic rebellions.   
Simultaneous to the Taiping Rebellion, the Nian Rebellion was taking place in Northern China.  
The name Nian refers to the rebels’ status as mobile bands, and the date of original insurrection is 
traced to 1851.  The Nian rebellion did not have a unified leadership nor did they have clear-cut 
objectives or goals.  The unifying factor among Nian gangs were a distaste with the ruling Qing and they 
drew their recruits from poor peasants.  They were poor, Han Chinese who were suffering in the 
economic climate.  The Qing finally suppressed the insurgency in 1868.   
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During the Taiping and Nian rebellions the Qing were also plagued by Muslim revolts throughout 
China.  These revolts first began in Yunnan in 1855 in response to heavy land taxes imposed on the 
Chinese Muslims, the Hui people, by the Qing.    This was not a revolt against Han Chinese as the rebel 
leader, Du Wenxiu, sought Han Chinese help in overthrowing the Qing.  Du Wenxiu would occupy the 
city of Dali creating the “Kingdom of the Pacified South” until the Manchus destroyed it in 1873.  Unlike 
Du’s revolt, in 1862 a Muslim revolt broke out in northwestern China due to local tensions between 
Chinese and the Muslims living there.  Militias broke out amongst religious and ethnic lines, Chinese 
crowds burned Muslims villages and by June the Muslims were besieging the Shaanxi cities of Xi’an and 
Tongzhou.  This tension would finally be put to rest after Qing forces took the Gansu city of Suzhou in 
November 1873.  In 1873 China was finally unified under Qing rule for the first time since 1850 with the 
exception of treaty ports.23  However the tremendous domestic chaos and eventual unification came at 
a great cost: the China’s population declined from 410 million in 1850 to roughly 350 million in 1873.24   
China would engage England again in the Second Opium War lasting from 1856-1860.  The 
pretext for the war resulted from the illegal Qing search of the British ship, the Arrow.  The British used 
this opportunity to seize Canton in 1858.  By 1858 they seized the strategic Dagu forts near Beijing in 
1858 with threats to invade Peking.  Fearing the capital might be destroyed; China went to the 
negotiating table and signed another unequal treaty, the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858.  Through this treaty 
the British were able to gain several concessions they desired: the right for a permanent embassy in 
Peking, the practice of Christianity protected (interesting provision considering the Qing was engaged in 
combating the fiercely Christian Taiping Rebellion), the immediate opening of six sea ports, the eventual 
opening of four ports along the Yangtze River once the insurrection was put down, and the protection of 
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travel throughout China (anywhere with passports, within thirty miles inland without passport).25  The 
only British concession was the evacuate Tianjin and return the Dagu forts to the Qing.  Per usual the 
Americans and French followed suit with similar treaties looking to gain trading privileges. 
However the Treaty of Tianjin was not the end of the Second Opium War.  The Qing seemed 
unwilling to abide by the terms of the treaty, leading the British to again attack the Dagu forts and 
enforce the treaty terms.  The Brits would lose this battle, one of the Qing’s few victories in foreign 
wars.  The British marched to Peking seeing to enforce the terms, and on October 18, 1860, Lord Elgin 
ordered the burning of the Summer Palace to humiliate the Qing.  This act humiliated the Qing 
government and the Chinese people – over 150 years later this act is still viewed as an act of national 
humiliation for the Chinese. The march on Peking, and the burning of the Emperor’s Summer Palace, did 
effectively end the Second Opium War bringing England and China to sign another treaty.  At the 
“Convention of Peking,” the Treaty of Tianjin was affirmed; along with Britain receiving more war 
amenities and part of the mainland Kowloon peninsula to add to its Hong Kong possession.   
The Convention of Peking also featured the Russians who sought to take advantage of China’s 
weakness and expand their territorial gains.  While the western nations had economic ambitions 
desiring trading privileges and rights, Russia and Japan had territorial ambitions on Chinese soil.  The 
Russians used the Convention of Peking to add-on to their territorial acquisitions acquired in the 1858 
Treaty of Aigun.  The Treaty of Aigun created the border along the Amur River, granting Russia all 
territory north of it.  All area south of the Amur that was east of the Ussuri would be jointly 
administered by both countries for the time being.  This granted Russia the ability to reach the Pacific.  
Russia would acquire the jointly-administered area in 1860 with the Convention of Peking.  This 
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established the modern day Russia-China border.  From these deals Russia gained 579,000 sq. miles and 
further humiliated the Chinese nation. 
It is amazing that the Qing Dynasty was able endure foreign wars and domestic upheaval from 
1839-1873 and not collapse.  However, the Qing would last until 1912 and the century of humiliation 
would only get worse.  Much of this is due to Imperial Japan’s territorial ambitions following 
Commodore Matthew Perry’s famous trip to open up Japan.  Japan quickly learned it was behind the 
Western world and launched the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to improve its power.  In 1879 Japan annexed 
the Ryukyu Island Chain which China also claimed and set out to annex Korea as well.  Korea may have 
suffered the same fate in the 1880s but Chinese diplomat Li Hongzhang convinced the Korean King to 
sign treaties with the Western nations to check Japan.  Li’s reasoning was that the Western nations had 
economic ambitions that although they might bring the “corrupting influences” of Opium and 
Christianity they did not have the territorial ambitions of the expansionist Japanese state.  Nonetheless 
China and Japan would find themselves competing for influence in Korea following the outbreak of 
rebellion in 1894.  Both countries sent troops, but Japan was able to seize the king and install a puppet 
pro-Japanese government.  This launched Japan and China into war. 
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 was a brief war that featured a total domination by the 
Japanese forces.  This was the direct result of Japan’s commitment to modern military force, and China’s 
recent turbulence during the century of humiliation.  The Japanese navy destroyed China’s within hours 
because the funds set aside for China’s Navy had been reallocated to reconstruct the Summer Palace 
which the British destroyed.26  The Treaty of Shimonoseki would end the hostilities, but it would be 
remembered as another unequal, humiliating treaty.  The treaty would have been more humiliating had 
a Japanese assassin not shot Li Hongzhang below the left eye during the negotiations.  This caused Japan 
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to demand less to save its international standing.  Nonetheless Li’s name, and the treaty, would go down 
in infamy.  China ceded Taiwan, the Pescadores and the Liaodong region to Japan; recognized Korea’s as 
autonomous protectorate of Japan independence; opened up four ports to trade; and paid massive war 
indemnities to Japan.  The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the island chain currently in dispute between both 
states, would also be recognized as Japan’s.  However within a week of the treaty a Russian-led “triple 
intervention” by Russia, Germany and France would return the Liaodong Peninsula to China.  At the 
peninsula’s tip lay the strategic port of Port Arthur (Lushun) that the Great Powers did not want falling 
into Japanese hands. 
The Sino-Japanese War ushered in a new era of the century of humiliation.  The years of 1898-
1899 brought intense pressure on the Qing by the imperial powers.  In 1898 Russia acquired a 
renewable lease on Port Arthur which finally gave Russia it’s deeply desired “warm-water port” while 
increasing its influence over Manchuria.  Russia would fortify the port while also sending troops to 
protect its investment of the Trans-Siberian Railway.  This competition for influence in Manchuria with 
Japan would prompt the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.  Germany would use an attack on its 
missionaries as a pretext to seize the Shandong port city of Qingdao and claim mining and railway rights 
in the surrounding countryside.  Germany’s influence in Qingdao lives today in the form of the Chinese 
beer Tsingtao.  Arguably China’s most popular beer and the number one Chinese beer in the United 
States, owes its origins to the German and English settlers who founded the Tsingtao Brewery there in 
1903.  The British would also occupy part of Shandong by attacking the harbor at Weihaiwei.  The British 
were able to obtain a lease on the port of Weihaiwei, which was opposite the Russian port of Port 
Arthur, while also obtaining a 99-year lease on the fertile farmland on the Kowloon Peninsula known as 
the “New Territories.”  The British would administer the New Territories until the lease ran out and 
returned the land to China in 1997.  During this time France would also secure its influence in Vietnam 
from Chinese influence. 
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The events of the late 19th century greatly influenced nationalism within China.  One 
manifestation of this was the strong anti-foreign sentiment of the Boxer Rebellion.  The Boxer Rebellion 
differed from the ones experienced during the Nian, Taiping and Muslim rebellions 25-50 years earlier.  
Those movements directed their hatred at the Manchu led Qing Dynasty, not at the foreign powers 
involved in China.  However, the Boxer Rebellion blamed China’s weakness more on the imperial foreign 
powers taking advantage of China.  The Boxer Rebellion drew its name from the secret-society called 
The Boxers United in Righteousness who emerged as an anti-foreign force in Shandong in 1898.  Many 
Boxers believed themselves to be invisible to bullets as a result of martial arts practice.  As noted above 
the province of Shandong was carved up by foreign powers in the years prior to the Boxer Rebellion.  
Like many rebellions in years prior, they lacked unified leadership to achieve their end goals, but were 
united by a zealotry anti-foreign fever.  Anything foreign or symbolic of the foreign presence would be 
attacked: diplomats, missionaries, Chinese Christian converts, western schools, and railroad and 
telegraph lines were all attacked.27   They were however not anti-Qing, so Empress Dowager on June 21, 
1900, praised the Boxers and issued a Declaration of War against the foreign powers which included the 
following: “The foreigners have been aggressive toward us, infringed upon our territorial integrity, 
trampled our people under their feet… They oppress our people and blaspheme our gods.  The common 
people suffer greatly at their hands, and each one of them is vengeful.  Thus it is that the brave 
followers of the Boxers have been burning churches and killing Christians.”28 
Following Empress Dowager’s Declaration of War, China naturally entered a war against all 
foreign powers with interests in China.  Lucky for the foreign powers the Boxer rebellion lacked strong 
leadership and not a large number of Qing troops joined in the attack.  Had that happened, more 
Westerners would be killed.  Instead a foreign power expeditionary forces consisting of 20,000 troops 
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mostly from Japan, Russia, Britain, United States and France, but also hailing from Germany, Austria-
Hungary and Italy, arrived in Peking in August 1900 to aid the foreign embassies under attack.  They 
were able to suppress the rebellion and negotiate another unequal treaty with Li Hongzhang in 1901.  
This peace treaty, known as the Boxer Protocol, forced China to pay more war amenities to the foreign 
powers, construct monuments in memory of the over 200 Westerners dead, and banned for five years 
any civil service examinations were anti-foreign atrocities took place.   
The next nationalistic revolution would be led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the father of Modern Chinese 
nationalism.  He led China’s new search for self-identity that help overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and 
begin China’s era as a nation-state.  He is honored in China for his contribution to nationalism and the 
creation of a new era in Chinese history where the Chinese ruled themselves.  His memory lives on at Dr. 
Sun Yat-sen’s Mausoleum in Nanjing, China where he is buried and his former residence in Shanghai, 
China.  The Museum in Shanghai goes into great detail to describe the century of humiliation, the 
unequal treaties, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s effort to restore Chinese pride by overthrowing the Manchu Qing 
Dynasty that kept China weak.  Unlike the Boxers, Sun nationalism did not manifest itself in any anti-
foreign zeal.  In fact, he was a converted Christian who had spent many years in the West and dreamed 
of turning China into a republic based upon the model of Western governments.  Sun would go on to 
become the First President of the Republic of China in 1912, transitioning China from an empire to a 
nation-state.  Doing so he declared China a multiethnic state populated by the Han majority and the four 
main ethnic minorities: the Tibetans, the Mongols, the Manchus, and the Hui (inclusive term for all 
Chinese Muslims at the time).29  Modern China retains the concept of being a multiethnic state, 
although today there are fifty-five nationally recognized majorities along with the Han majority. 
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Dr. Sun Yet-sun led the Revolutionary Alliance, an affiliation of many anti-Qing groups 
committed to overthrowing the Qing Dynasty by force.  While the Chinese people were divided about 
what political and economic system they should replace the Qing with, it was clear that the Chinese 
people expressed a strong sentiment to restore themselves as rulers of their own territory.  The 
Revolutionary Alliance was created in 1905 in Tokyo and led a series of uprisings from 1906-1911 that 
were all suppressed by the Qing.30  However the movement would continue to fight due to the strong 
mood of nationalism that devoured China, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s persistence to overthrow the Qing.  By 
the summer of 1911 the number of active Revolutionary members reached 10,000 a tremendous 
growth from its humble beginnings of 400 in 1905.31  The successful revolution would outbreak after an 
accident explosion in Hankou on October 9, 1911 while Dr. Sun Yat-sen was in the United States 
fundraising for the revolution.  The revolution then moved entirely too quickly to be controlled by any 
individual or political party.32  Nonetheless, Dr. Sun Yat-sen would return to China in December to be 
elected Provincial President of the New Chinese Republic on December 29, 1911.  He would assume 
office in Nanjing at the start of the New Year, but the Qing had still not abdicated the throne: for the 
first 6 weeks of 1912 China had both a Republican President and a Manchu emperor.  The two sides 
conducted negotiations until the emperor abdicated the throne on February 12, 1912.  In return Dr. Sun 
Yat-sen resigned as President and gave presidential powers to the former premier of the Qing Dynasty, 
Yuan Shikai.  Dr. Sun Yet-san knew that although his influence was strong and contagious, he lacked a 
power base amongst the military and it seemed Yuan Shikai was the only individual capable of unifying 
the country.  The Revolutionary Alliance hoped Yuan would continue to rule from Nanjing, but he 
decided to keep the capital in Peking.  So in 1912 China embarked on its first series of Chinese self-rule 
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since the Ming Dynasty fell in 1644.  This proved to be a daunting task, and the century of humiliation 
was far from over.   
  The new Republican government held elections for the National Assembly in December 1912.  In 
preparation for this Sun transformed the Revolutionary Alliance into a political party known as the 
National People’s Party of the Kuomintang (KMT).  The KMT emerged victorious in the election with its 
party leader, Song Jiaoren, poised to be named Premier.  However, on March 20 he would be 
assassinated on a Shanghai railroad platform, and it is widely believed that Yuan Shikai was behind the 
plot.33  This would lead to a series of events in 1913 in which Yuan would solidify his grip on power, ban 
the KMT and exile Dr. Sun Yat-sen.  Yuan would then claim himself emperor and rule until his death in 
1916.  His death would usher in an “era of warlordism” that plagued China for a decade.  After Yuan’s 
death, Sun returned to China and reestablished the KMT.  Sun would be the de facto head of the KMT 
until his death in 1925 handed power over to Chiang Kai-shek. 
 Europe became engulfed in World War I during Yuan Shikai’s reign, leaving them uninterested in 
China for the time being.  However, in 1914 Japan declared War on Germany (result of 1902 alliance 
with England) and thus attacked the German concession areas in Shandong province.  In 1915 Japan 
would humiliate China by issuing the infamous “Twenty One Demands” demanding Japan get an 
increase of economic control over Manchuria and other parts of China.  China then came to the 
conclusion that if they entered the war effort on the Allies side they would be able to regain the 
strategic German concessions in the areas around Qingdao.  In an attempt to earn favor with the allies 
China sent around 100,000 laborers to Western Europe from 1916-1918.  However at the Treaty of 
Versailles the Great Powers agreed to give Japan the German concessions in Shandong.  This again is 
another example of an unequal treaty from the Chinese perspective.  On May 4, 1919 a massive 
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demonstration of college students publicly demonstrated against Versailles’s granting the Shandong 
concessions to Japan.  The date of this protest would bear the name of new nationalistic movement in 
China: the May 4 movement.  This movement was basically a country-wide movement with reformers 
sharing a central idea of seeing a strong unified China capable of combating the problems of warlordism, 
the “feudal” exploitative landlord system, and foreign imperialism.34 
 The intellectual beliefs of the May 4th movement laid the foundation for the creation of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  The CCP was founded by Chen Duxiu, and held its first meeting on July 
23, 1921 in Shanghai.35  These meeting featured thirteen delegates representing different areas of 
China, including a young Mao Zedong representing Hunan.  The site of the first plenary meeting of the 
CCP now exists as a museum in Shanghai.  In 1923 the CCP aligned with a reorganized KMT that based its 
ideology on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People: anti-imperialist nationalism, democracy and 
socialism.  This alliance put the KMT in charge of China during the warlord era.  Chiang Kai-shek would 
be appointed military commander by Sun, and take over following his death.  Chiang’s Northern 
Expedition (1926-1928) ended in the reunification of China (more so in name than practice) and marked 
the end of the warlord era.  However, during the Northern expedition there would be a split in the KMT-
CCP alliance that sowed the seeds for the Chinese Civil War.  The fracture in the alliance had its roots in 
the CCP’s secret mission to push the KMT in a leftist direction.  This mission involved influence from 
Stalin, the Comintern and the leftist leaders within the KMT.  These leaders were disgusted by Chiang’s 
actions in Shanghai that April, where it appeared he was allying with the rich bourgeoisie merchants of 
Shanghai.  This fracture in 1927 began the twenty-two Civil War that would end in a Communist victory 
and the birth of the People’s Republic of China.   
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 The first phase of the Chinese Civil War lasted from 1927-1937.  The CCP recruited an army in 
the countryside that would act as an insurgency against Chiang’s KMT.  Mao operated from the belief 
that a successful revolution would consist mainly of countryside peasants and not from the workers 
proletariat.  During this phase the famous “Long March,” became a defining moment in the history of 
Chinese communism.  With the Red Army weakened and on the verge of destruction, Zhou Enlai devised 
a strategy for the Communists to evacuate Jiangxi Province.36  During this period Mao Zedong assumed 
the military leadership and the Long March cemented his rise to power within the communist party.  
The Red Army left Jiangxi province on October 16, 1934, with 80,000 troops only to arrive in Yan’an in 
Shanxi Province with about 8,000 to 9,000 troops.37  They marched roughly 6,000 miles in 370 days.  
While the Long March provided Communist leaders with strength and created a powerful propaganda 
force, the Communists lost almost all of the territory and influence they had previously gained 
throughout the Communist revolution.  The Communists were not stronger at the end of the Long 
March than they had been during the years of the initial split with the KMT.38  The mountains of Yan’an 
would now provide the base of Communist power. 
 Japan’s 1937 invasion of China, and the ensuing occupation that followed, further prevented 
China’s attempt to unify and create a centralized state.  The period of 1937-1945 would feature an eerie 
resemblance to the Warring States period before the Qin emperor first unified China in 221 BC as Japan 
controlled much of Eastern China, the KMT held its power in Chongqing, the Communists controlled 
Shaanxi, the Japanese allowed the Mongolians to function independently, Xinjiang was ruled by a 
warlord, and the Dalai Lama ruled Tibet.39  On July 7, 1937, following an incident at the Marco Polo 
Bridge, Japanese troops invaded China launching the second Sino-Japanese War.  By December 13 
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Japanese troops would reach the Chinese capital at Nanjing.  The seven weeks that followed are 
remembered as the “Rape of Nanjing” where Japanese troops ran wild through Nanjing, murdering, 
looting and raping.  According to historian Jonathan Spence:  
The number of women who were raped, many of whom died after repeated assaults, 
was estimated by foreign observers in Nanjing at 20,000; fugitive soldiers killed were 
estimated at 30,000; murdered civilians at 12,000.  Other contemporary estimates made 
by Chinese observers were as much as ten times higher, and it is difficult to establish 
exact figures.40 
 The period of Japanese control, more so than any period throughout the century of humiliation, 
arguably left the most haunting impact on the Chinese national conscience.  Japan controled much of 
eastern China until it surrendered to the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945.  After Japan’s surrender 
China regained all of the territory Japan had acquired from China since the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.  
This includes Manchuria and Taiwan.  China contends that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the islands 
currently under dispute between Japan and China, were returned to China following World War II while 
Japan believes they never were.  The vacuum of Japanese control over China ushered in the second 
phase of the civil war between the CCP and the KMT.  Mao’s communists elected for a strategy of 
controlling the countryside while Chiang’s KMT sought to hold the cities.  Mao’s guerilla forces would 
constantly disrupt the Chiang’s supply chains, weakening the importance of holding the cities.  Through 
a protracted war based upon wei-qi strategy Mao would emerge the victor in 1949 as Chiang’s forces 
retreated to Taiwan.  
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the foundation of the People’s Republic of China 
and famously exclaimed that “the Chinese people have stood up.”  This was an acknowledgment of the 
end of China’s century of humiliation.  Mao Zedong would led the journey of restoring Chinese national 
pride and identity and be honored as another successful unifier of China.  Chinese history applauds 
those unify China that end periods of chaos and disunity.  Following China’s dynastic precedent, Mao 
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claimed the previous boundaries the Qing Dynasty held at its maximum extent.  This included several 
areas that were currently exercising de facto independence or administered by foreign powers: The 
British controlled Hong Kong; the Portuguese administered Macau; Russia protected Mongolian 
independence; The East Turkestan Republic controlled parts of Xinjiang with Russia help; the Dali Lama 
operated Tibet with British help; and the KMT established the Republic of China on Taiwan.  Mao 
Zedong claimed all of these territories belonged to China.  China would have to relinquish its claim to 
Outer Mongolia and recognize the country of Mongolia due to the USSR’s insistence.  China would 
eventually administer the territories of Hong Kong, Macau, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet.  Taiwan 
is another issue entirely: China claims Taiwan is still a province of China while the area maintains its de 
facto independence.  Many people say that the century of humiliation will not end until Taiwan is 
officially reunited with the mainland. 
The century of humiliation still affects Chinese nationalism today.  First, it paved the way for the 
modern Chinese state and nationalism.  After all Dr. Sun Yat-sen is still honored as the father of Chinese 
nationalism even though the political party he created fought in a Civil War against the CCP and 
currently resides in Taiwan.  Second it celebrates the Chinese historic theme of unifying the nation and 
fighting disunity.  Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China has fought disunity amongst its population 
at the expense of endangering its international reputation and human rights violations.  This has been 
seen it its suppression of protests throughout the country including the infamous June 4, 1989 
crackdown at Tiananmen Square.  Also, it has caused the People’s Republic of China to encourage a 
state-led nationalism and view internal critics not as dissenters but as enemies of the state.  This can be 
seen through the suppression of minority nationalism and ethnic-conflict within China.  Third, it left 
China viewing the principle of territorial integrity as the number one priority.  Any attempt to take a 
piece of Chinese territory away from China, or aiding a domestic separatist movement will be viewed 
with suspicion.  Fourth, it left China suspicious of treaties and territorial disputes.  China remembers that 
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it lost much of its territory through treaties with foreign powers and this makes resolving the island 
disputes in the South and East China Seas very difficult.  Finally, most Chinese believe that the century of 
humiliation will not be fully completed until Taiwan is unified with the mainland.  Any attempt to keep 
Taiwan independent is partly from the Chinese perspective an attempt to keep China weak and prevent 





Case Studies of China’s Border Wars: 
 The purpose of this chapter is to conduct case studies of times China’s has gone to war to 
protect its border.  Since 1949 China has gone to war three times over disputed territory: 1962 with 
India, 1969 with Russia, and 1979 with Vietnam.  Also included is the 1950-1953 Korean War because 
although China was not fighting over disputed territory, it did engage in the conflict to protect its 
border.  China is especially concerned about its borders, as it shares borders with the following 14 
countries: North Korea, Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
India, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar/Burma, Laos and Vietnam (China has consolidated land border with all 
states except India).  This leaves China naturally concerned about encirclement.  Some scholars argue 
Chinese strategic thinking about its borders is rooted in the ancient Chinese game wei-qi.41  One of the 
main objectives of wei-qi is territorial consolidation from the outside-in, by controlling the borders.  
Thus before indulging on China’s quest to consolidate its interior, we must first understand China’s 
attempt to defend the borders since 1949.   
Conflict with India 
 Today, virtually the entire 2,521 mile (4,057 km) land border is under dispute, and the total area 
under dispute is roughly the size of Alabama at over 52,125 sq miles (135,000 sq km).42  However, in 
1962 China and India went to war over this territory.  For most of India and China’s history the two 
states were separated by the Tibetan plateau that limited cultural contacts. This all changed in 1951 
after the Chinese annexation of Tibet.43  The conquering of Tibet brought Tibet under CCP rule and 
expanded China’s external border to India, thus placing troops on the border.  Mao invaded Tibet in 
October 1950 while the world attention was focused on the Korean War, and India’s leader Jawaharlal 
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Nehru believed that China would not invade Tibet.  Nehru was surprised by China’s aggressive moves 
since he had been “led to believe by the Chinese Foreign Office that the Chinese would settle the future 
of Tibet in a peaceful manner by direct negotiation with the representatives of Tibet.”44 
 The spread of Chinese rule to Tibet brought the disputed territory between India and China to 
the forefront of their relationship.  In the Easter Sector China claimed an area it considered “South 
Tibet,” but India administered as the state of Arunachal Pradesh due to its interpretation of the 
McMahon Line that delimited the border between Britain and Tibet in 1914.  Although Chinese 
representatives were present at the conference, they initialed but did not sign the document because 
China believed that Tibet was still part of China; thus Tibet could not maintain its own sovereignty and 
China could not acknowledge the validity of Indian Administration under the McMahon Line.45  In the 
western disputed area lies the territory Aksai Chin which is administered by China, but also claimed by 
India.  To further complicate this issue this territory today also contains 2,000 square miles ceded to 
Beijing by Pakistan, India’s rival.46  Both countries have yet to reach an agreement on these territories 
but China seems to have offered twice to resolve the disputes by accepting Indian control over the 
Arunachal, and India accepting the Chinese control over Aksai Chin.  The first attempt being in 1959 
under Zhou Enlai was preempted by the Dalai Lama’s flight to India.47  Then again in 1979 it seems Deng 
Xiaoping explored the idea of each side giving up its claims with some “minor readjustments.”48   
 Today’s territorial tensions are strategically based.  The Aksai Chin is important for China 
because it contains a road linking western Tibet and western Xinjiang, and it is important for India 
because it is lies to the east of the Kashmir territory disputed between India and Pakistan.49  The Aksai 
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Chin is nearly inaccessible from India, thus it took India several months before it realized China was 
building that road in 1955.50  The Indian administered of Arunachal Pradesh is important to both sides 
because of its location and large ethnic Tibetan population.  These areas were fought over in the 1962 
Sino-Indian War, but failed to produce any lasting change in control.  The war began on October 20, 
1962, with a Chinese assault on Indian positions in disputed territory and on November 21 China 
announced a unilateral ceasefire with intentions to withdraw from seized territory, ending the fighting 
that left 722 Chinese and 4,885 Indian soldiers dead.51  This attack was precipitated by India’s late 1961 
“Forward Policy,” that increased its military presence in the disputed territory that it held, and aimed to 
prevent China from advancing further and dominate Chinese posts in already administered Indian 
territory.52  This move weakened China’s claims to the territory, threatened China’s territorial integrity 
and the domestic economic crisis of the Great Leap Forward magnified the assessment of the danger of 
Indian actions.53  Mao’s attack was largely political and aimed at using the element of surprise to draw a 
rapid conclusion to the end of the conflict.  It also illustrated a theme of Chinese foreign policy: China 
will not allow force to threaten its border, it will meet force with force, and once it believes war is 
inevitable China will strike to gain the initiative.  Mao’s premier, Zhou Enlai, stated that the war was 
intended “to teach India a lesson,”54 while a Chinese diplomat claimed that Mao attacked under the goal 
of deterrence and that attacking India would “create 10 years of border stability.”  One lesson rings the 
truest: that China will not let its territorial claims be challenged by foreign force, even if a foreign 
country legally administers the territory China claims.   
Conflict with USSR 
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 On the morning of March 2, 1969 two Chinese patrols ambushed Soviet border guards on 
Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River.  A second clash occurred again on March 15, and by the 
conflicts end China suffered 91 causalities (30 killed, 61 wounded) while the USSR suffered over 200 
casualties (approximately 91 killed and 109 wounded).55  These conflicts were precipitated by rivalry for 
leadership of the soviet bloc, and a buildup of force in the Russia Far East.  Upon proclaiming China a 
communist state in October 1949, Mao and Stalin developed a communist brother relationship but Mao 
always resented being the “little brother.”   Furthermore, Mao disapproved of the Soviet assertion that 
they should speak for world communism.  The relationship between Beijing and Moscow improved 
briefly after Stalin’s death in 1953, only to get worse under Nikita Khrushchev.  Mao disliked 
Khrushchev’s public criticism of Stalin, his often-abrasive manner, and his attempt to improve relations 
with the West.56  This relationship became malignant in 1962 following Mao’s criticism of Khrushchev in 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his support for India in Sino-India War.  After the relationship fallout, 
Beijing brought up historical border disputes that had been irrelevant during the period of brotherhood 
between communist leaders, and demanded that Moscow return its 19th century land acquisitions from 
the Qing Empire.57  China especially disagreed that the border was determined along China’s bank of the 
Ussuri, granting the USSR all islands in the river including Zhenbao (Damansky).  In 1966 the USSR signed 
a defense treaty with Mongolia that allowed the Soviets to deploy troops along the Mongolian-China 
border which stretched 2,000 km along China’s northern frontier.58  By 1969, there were thirty-four 
Soviet divisions facing China; a stark increase from the fourteen divisions facing China in 1965.59  China’s 
fears about Soviet build-up were heightened by the Soviet “Brezhnev Doctrine” which the USSR claimed 
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they had the right to intervene with force in any socialist state to defend socialism against 
counterrevolution.  In 1968 the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia to end the Prague Spring movement to 
liberalize communism, and the USSR believed the Cultural Revolution to be a form of 
counterrevolution.60  Thus, China was suspicious that the USSR would use the Brezhnev Doctrine to 
invade China. 
 The Zhenbao Island incident was very similar to the Chinese strategy launching the 1962 Sino-
Indian War.  Fravel states that “China sought to counter what it believed to be increasing military 
pressure created by a sharp decline in the local military balance and assertive Soviet behavior during a 
period of domestic unrest.  The goal of the Heilongjiang MD initial plan was to teach the Soviets a ‘bitter 
lesson’ about the dangers of armed confrontations over disputed areas.”61   Just like in India in 1962, 
China launched the attack but its purpose was defensive.  Kissinger explains this aspect of Chinese 
political thought as “offensive or preemptive deterrence.”  He explains that this “concept involves the 
use of preemptive strategy not so much to defeat the adversary militarily as to deal him a psychological 
blow to cause him to desist.”62  However the offensive deterrence philosophy did not cause USSR to 
immediately desist.  Rather the USSR increased military pressure on China in both the eastern and 
western sectors including an August 13 raid with 300 soldiers and tank tanks that resulted in the killing 
of approximately twenty border guards near Tielieketi in Xinjiang.63  Soon after the USSR threatened 
China with attacks on its nuclear facilities in Xinjiang.  The USSR attacks in Xinjiang and its nuclear 
threats gave the USSR the initiative in the conflict that China sought to create in the Zhenbao incident.  
In October Mao thought the nuclear strike was so imminent that he sent all leaders (except Zhou Enlai) 
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to disperse throughout China and alert China’s nuclear forces.64  Besides a strike on nuclear facilities in 
Xinjiang, Soviet leaders considered a ground attack into Manchuria (located in Northeast China and the 
industrial heartland of China at the time) to which China had no defense against except a “people’s 
war,” so China invited Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin to Beijing to diffuse the conflict.65  These October 
formal talks between Zhou Enlai and Alexey Koshyin focused solely on crisis management and not 
resolving the sovereignty dispute. 
 With the conflict resolved, China and the USSR entered into a cold war but neither side pursued 
armed conflict as it did in 1969.  This period created a strategic triangle between the United States, USSR 
and China that lead to Nixon’s 1972 visit to China.  The US rapprochement, combined with the US effort 
to end the war in Vietnam allowed China to station more troops along its northern border and focus its 
efforts on the Soviet military threat and encirclement.66  Soviet encirclement began with an increase of 
troops along the northern border, a growing Soviet Pacific Fleet, increased military aid to North Korea, 
and a 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India that helped India’s modernize armed 
forces.67  India was still only nine years removed from a border war with China that left territory 
uncontested, and India still allowed the Dalai Lama to run a government-in-exile.  The encirclement also 
included a 1978 formal alliance with unified Vietnam (China’s southeastern border) that allowed 
Vietnam to invade Cambodia and granted Soviet access to Cam Ranh Bay and Danang Naval Bases, and a 
1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.68 
Conflict with Vietnam 
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 In 1979 Chinese troops invaded Vietnam to “teach Vietnam a lesson” regarding border disputes, 
mistreatment of ethnic Chinese, and to resist Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia.69  This was essentially the 
Third Vietnam War, with the anticolonial war with France being the first war and the US-Vietnam War 
the second.  The build-up to this conflict began during the final days of the Second Vietnam War, as 
Hanoi and Beijing competed for dominance in Indochina and Southeast Asia.  Vietnam planned to 
establish an Indochinese Federation during its conquest of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.  This made 
China and Vietnam inevitable enemies.  In June of 1978 the Vietnamese Politburo identified China as its 
“principal enemy.”70  In November 1978 the USSR and Vietnam signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation.  In December Vietnam invaded Cambodia, overthrew the Khmer Rouge and installed a 
Vietnamese puppet government.71  Sensing the trend turning against China, Deng Xiaoping decided to 
employ their “offensive deterrence” or “preemptive deterrence” principle and strike Vietnam.  The use 
of this principle can best be described by Henry Kissinger: “When Chinese planners conclude that their 
opponent is gaining unacceptable advantage and that the strategic trend is turning against them, they 
respond by seeking to undermine the enemy’s confidence and allow China to reclaim the psychological, 
if not material, upper hand.”72 
 On February 17, 1979 China invaded Vietnam from the Guanxi and Yunnan Provinces.73  This was 
a massive military operation consisting of roughly 450,000 troops, on a similar scale of its entry into the 
Korean War in November 1950.74  This invasion was similar to China’s entry in the Sino-Indian War, as 
China performed its limited strike followed by a retreat.75  The war was over in twenty-nine days, 
compared to the Sino-Indian War’s thirty-two day conflict.  Because China was not able to force the 
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Vietnamese to leave Cambodia or restore the Khmer Rouge to power while suffering heavy casualties, 
many criticized (especially the western media) this operation as a major failure.  It did however force 
Vietnam to maintain troops along its Chinese border out of fear of another Chinese “lesson,” that 
depended upon the USSR to provide capital for the logistical support because it did not have a big 
enough work force.76  Thus when the fall of the Soviet Union occurred in 1989 Vietnam could no longer 
support its military force, retreated from Cambodia, and paved the way for Cambodia to become an 
independent state.    The invasion also showed Vietnam that China could easily penetrate into Vietnam, 
destroy their towns and villages at any cost, then withdraw.77  It also prevented Vietnam from invading 
Thailand out of fear of another Chinese invasion, and also taught the USSR to not get involved in a long-
drawn out war with China.  Thus Lee Kwan Yew states that while “the western press wrote off the 
Chinese punitive action as a failure.  I believe it changed the history of East Asia.”78  
Offshore Island Conflicts with Vietnam. 
 Twice China has fought with Vietnam to consolidate contested offshore islands in the South 
China Sea by force.  In 1974 China took the Crescent Group in the western Parcels held by South 
Vietnam, and in 1988 it occupied six features in the Spratly Islands also claimed by Vietnam and the 
Philippines.79  China had claimed these islands since 1951 but had lacked the naval presence to assert its 
claims.80 
Conflict with US: The Korean War 
 Although the Korean War was not fought over contested territory, it is in a sense a border war 
and should be included as a case study.  It helps to further understand China’s fear of encirclement and 
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principles of offensive/preemptive deterrence.  At the end of World War II Korea was divided along the 
38th parallel into North and South Korea reflecting the limits the Soviet and American armies had 
reached at the end of the war (Soviets in North and Americans in South).  Before the war Korea had 
been a Japanese colony.  Thus Kim Il-sung of the North sought to reunify Korea into one communist 
country by invading South Korea.  Mao Zedong, at heart a communist revolutionary, liked the idea of a 
unified communist Korea, but was unwilling to approve the invasion due to likely American intervention 
and thought the Korea unification should wait until after China completed its reunification through 
conquest of Taiwan.81  Kim Il-sung attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950.  Truman, fearing the 
expansion of communism, linked the Korean War to the Chinese civil war by sending ground forces to 
Korea and ordering the US Pacific Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwanese Straight to prevent Mao from 
invading Taiwan.82  Mao determined the fleet intervention as hypocritical since Truman had promised to 
not intervene over Taiwan, and Mao had been assembling forces to invade Taiwan before Truman’s 
decision.83  The U.N. Security Council approved the intervention because Beijing’s seat was occupied by 
Taipei, and Moscow abstained. 
 China began planning for a possible intervention in the Korean War immediately.  Although 
most people hold the view that China decided to enter the war upon the US decision to cross the 38th 
parallel and MacArthur’s push towards the Yalu River, China began its debate on intervention at the 
advent of American deployment.  The decision to enter the war only became inevitable after the 
crossing of the 38th parallel because of China’s fear of encirclement (troops along Chinese border) and 
Mao’s unwillingness to let communist North Korea fall.  Following the successful invasion at Inchon and 
victory by U.N. Forces, on September 20 Premier Zhou Enlai outlined the principles for military action in 
Korea: “The war to resist America and assist Korea should be conducted as a protracted war on the basis 
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of self-reliance. In every campaign and battle, we have to gain superiority by concentrating our 
manpower and firepower in order to break up and destroy the enemy. By weakening the enemy 
gradually, we will be able to carry out a protracted war.”84  The decision to cross the 38th parallel was a 
hotly debated topic in the State Department and Pentagon.  However, most voices favored crossing the 
38th parallel because it was an arbitrary line drawn of a homogenous nation.85  General Douglas 
MacArthur especially favored crossing the 38th parallel and pushing towards the Yalu.  At this time China 
offered many warnings to the US about not crossing the 38th parallel.  On October 3 Premier Zhou Enlai 
issued a warning to the US through the Indian ambassador to Beijing, K.M. Panikkar, that if the US 
crossed the 38th parallel China would intervene, but Secretary of State Acheson believed China was 
bluffing.86  Lee Kwan Yew after discussing a conversation with Deng Xiaoping regarding Chinese foreign 
policy has stated: “The Chinese had never concealed their views, and what the Chinese people said 
counted.  During the Korean War, China had issued a statement that if the Americans approached the 
Yalu River, the Chinese people could not sit idly by.  But the American’s took no notice.  On foreign 
policy, China always spoke what it thought.”87 
 On October 7, 1950, the crossing of the 38th parallel and invasion of North Korean territory was 
authorized by a United Nations resolution.88  Misconceptions and misperceptions would cause the lead-
up to the war.  Chinese leaders would not allow the United States to push towards the Yalu River which 
had already been used as a traditional invasion route of China:  Japan had invaded northern China from 
there before World War II and the Manchurians came from the northeast to establish the Qing Dynasty.  
Stalin even pledged military support to China following a US reaction towards Chinese intervention, but 
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failed to stand-by his commitment he pledged towards Mao.89  Finally on October 19, 1950 Mao ordered 
his army to cross into Korea with only a Soviet pledge of logistical support, and would push the United 
States back until an armistice agreement was reached on July 27, 1953, again dividing North and South 
Korea at the prewar line of the 38th parallel.90   
Conclusion of External Conflicts: 
 Since the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China has on several times used 
force to protect what it is has declared its external boundaries.  China has a long history of foreign 
invasions that shape the decisions of Chinese political leaders.  In all of China’s conflicts they used the 
principle of offensive/preemptive deterrence and initiated the conflict.  They also point to a sense of 
justice by which China will teach other countries “a lesson.”  From a western sense these conflicts seem 
offensive, but they were truly defensive minded.  China will not wait for foreign armies to invade; they 
will strike to gain the initiative once war has been deemed inevitable.  The People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA)- the collective name for Chinese armed forces has autonomy in training, equipping and managing 
wars but civilian leaders determine where future conflicts will arise and decide when to go to war.91  
According the Nathan and Scobell “It was Mao who decided to intervene in Korea in 1950, to develop 
nuclear weapons in 1955, to launch a war with India in 1962, and to ambush Soviet troops in early 1969.  
Deng Xiaoping decided on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979 and on the naval clash with Vietnam 
in the Spratly Islands in 1988.”92  Today, Xi Jinping will be the leader who decides when and where China 
will go to war. 
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There are challenges to preserving the unity of the Chinese people within the People’s Republic 
of China.  These lie in incorporating minority people’s into the Chinese idea of a united Chinese nation-
state.  China is roughly 91.5% Han Chinese, and the other 8.5% of the peoples come from a variety of 55 
minorities.  While China desires to be a multi-ethnic nation-state, it faces challenges to do so with the 
minority populations.  This is because China more so desires to create a united state and shows of ethnic 
identity are often perceived to be threats to preserving Chinese unity.  So while in theory China 
attempts to be a nation state, in practice it suppresses ethnic nationalism because it is incompatible 
with Beijing’s goal of returning to its rightful place as the middle kingdom. 
 To give ethnic minorities a sense of ethnic identity and individuality there are currently five 
autonomous regions within China: Inner Mongolia (Mongolian minority), Xinjiang (Uyghur minority), 
Guangxi (Zhuang minority), Ningxia (Hui minority) and Tibet (Tibetan minority).  This system of granting 
ethnic minorities autonomous regions derived from Stalin’s incorporation of autonomous regions into 
the Soviet Union.  They were different in that they were not given the theoretical ability to succeed as 





they were in the USSR.94  China is too haunted by the century of humiliation to even entertain the idea 
of territories being granted their independence.  Today, Xinjiang and Tibet pose a threat to China’s 
state-led nationalism, unity and territorial integrity.  The other three autonomous regions do not pose a 
threat to China’s territorial integrity and all currently have a distinct majority Han population.  While 
Xinjiang and Tibet each pose threats to China’s territorial integrity and the Chinese image of a united 
nation, they both do so in different manners. 
 China likes to promote the idea that Xinjiang has been Chinese territory without interruption 
since the Han dynasty.  This, however, is far from the truth.  A 2002 White Paper claimed China has ruled 
Xinjiang uninterrupted since the Han established an outpost 60 BC, but in fact no Chinese would rule the 
area since the Tang Dynasty left in 755 until the Qing’s conquest in 1758.95  Xinjiang’s true status as 
Chinese territory can be taken from its name which is translated to mean “New Territories” or “New 
Frontier.”  In relation to majority of Chinese territory, its status as being property of China is fairly 
recent.  The territory became incorporated into China following the Qing conquest by China’s longest 
emperor, Qianlong.  By consolidating Xinjiang, Qianlong was able to double China’s size, end the 
Zunghar troubles (China’s western enemy), and create a firm western and northern border with Russia.96  
Unlike today’s ruling regime, the Qing did not aim to incorporate Xinjiang into their state because of a 
deeply held belief that Xinjiang always belonged to them, but were driven by simpler motives: security 
and self-sufficiency.97  It was not conquered for “Sinicization” as some might speculate.  Originally it was 
not open to Chinese settlement or colonization and kept as a strategic frontier zone, and Xinjiang was 
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allowed to keep their religious leaders, dietary practices and were not forced to shave their heads or 
wear the Manchu queues.98   
 The Qing Dynasty’s early years were filled with expansion.  From 1683 to 1760, Xinjiang, Taiwan, 
the southwestern provinces, Mongolia, Kokonor and Tibet were all permanently acquired territories.99  
They would face difficulty incorporating these acquisitions into their state, and the main hotspots of the 
Qing conquest continue to be troubling for Chinese leaders today: Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan.  Mao 
Zedong, the creator of the current dynasty, proclaimed all territory held by the Qing at their maximal 
extent to be PRC territory.  During the period of century of humiliation where China was filled with 
domestic upheavals (1850-1873) as Xinjiang would be the center of Muslim rebellions.  Russia also 
seized some of the fertile farmland in the Ili Valley.  This territory would be returned in the 1881 Treaty 
of St. Petersburg and in 1884 Xinjiang officially became a Chinese province.  However, before the land 
was returned to China, thousands of Uyghurs fled to Russia controlled territory fearing Qing rule.100  
When the Qing Dynasty fell as a result of the 1911 Revolution, there was no immediate movement 
towards creating an independent state as there was in Tibet or Mongolia.  This was due to there being 
no unified independence force, and a tremendous Chinese military presence in Xinjiang.  Although there 
is tremendous ethnic-tension in Xinjiang today, it still lacks a unified voice/movement. If strong 
leadership can take advantage of this situation, China could be in trouble.  
 During the period of KMT rule, Uyghurs would establish two short-lived East Turkestan Republics 
during the years of 1933-1934 and 1944-1945.  This was influenced in part by Uyghur nationalism which 
has begun to escalate since the turn of the century.  The so-called “Uyghur Enlightenment” began when 
wealthy Uyghur merchants and industrialists returned from Istanbul, Kazan and Europe and launched a 
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modernized Uyghur education with nationalistic ideas.101  This period began the ethnic nationalism that 
is currently in Xinjiang.  Following the creation of People’s Republic of China, the PLA army was able to 
easily consolidate its control over Xinjiang in 1950 with little resistance.  At this time most Uyghurs felt 
their fate was better sealed with living under Russian rule in a potential “Uyghuristan” or “Turkistan” like 
the other Central Asian peoples, and many fled to Russian rule following the assertion of Chinese rule.102 
 The early years of PRC rule in Xinjiang showed great promise of allowing the Uyghurs to keep 
their identity alive.  This was a theme of Chinese policy towards minorities before the Great Leap 
Forward.  Tibet, like Xinjiang, would also remain untouched for the early Mao years.  For both provinces 
this changed with the launching of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) and intensified during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).  The days during the height of Maoism could be characterized with 
oppressiveness towards Uyghurs that failed to live up to the initial promise of preserving Uyghur 
identity.  The Cultural Revolution was especially destructive because of the stated goal to destroy the 
four olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas.  From the perspective of Han chauvinism or 
communism, minority cultures contained all of these “olds” and thus were especially persecuted.  In 
Xinjiang, Mosques were used as centers to corral pigs, Muslim men were forced to shave their beards 
and young Uyghur girls had their braids clipped.103  This height of Maoism left bitterness towards China 
in Xinjiang. 
 The potential end date of the Cultural Revolution can be considered to be in 1969 when Mao 
officially declared it to be over, in 1971 with the death of Lin Biao, or in 1976 with the death of Mao 
Zedong.  Regardless, the passing of Mao and removal of the Gang of Four brought in a more pragmatic, 
less ideological leadership to Beijing.  Deng Xiaoping would soon rise to power and he promoted Hu 
Yaobang to powerful positions, bringing a more lenient policy throughout the 1980s towards Uyghurs.  
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Hu desired to create a more tolerant environment in Xinjiang and encourage the promotion of ethnic 
cadres within CCP leadership.  However, the 1980s were also a time for complete disenchantment with 
the Chinese state following the devastating Cultural Revolution.  It would pave the way for the 
outbreaks of violence in the 90s and 2000s.   
During the 1980s Uyghurs became bitter over increasing Han migration into Xinjiang and nuclear 
testing throughout the province.  The area around Lop Nor is poisoned from 23 nuclear tests done 
between 1964 to 1981 before China starting testing underground.104  Nuclear weapons and missile 
testing continue in Xinjiang to this day.  Han migration was official policy during the Cultural Revolution 
in which many Han youths were “sent down” to the countryside to live on production and construction 
farms.  Many of those who were sent to Xinjiang were from Shanghai.105  Since the 1980s it has not been 
official policy, but Han migration has been encouraged to assimilate Xinjiang into the PRC.  However, the 
Uyghurs do not seem to be integrating into the Chinese way of life, nor share a sense of Chinese 
identity.  They desire to be Uyghurs, not Chinese.  
 In 1979, with Deng Xiaoping at the helm China made a decision to open its economy and 
integrate with the west.  Deng’s policy focused on developing the Chinese economy by establishing four 
special economic zones (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) along the southeastern coast.  In 1984 
he would open up fourteen more coastal cities to foreign investment, and the south and eastern coasts 
remain the economic power hub for the Chinese economy.  This coastal development policy created the 
demand or Xinjiang’s coal, oil, and gas reserves.106  Today Xinjiang remains one of the China’s largest 
producers of fossil fuels, but Uyghurs complain that the economic benefits go to Han and not Uyghurs. 
Hence there is a feeling of resentment amongst Uyghurs that Han Chinese are exploiting the regions 
                                                          
104
 Karmel, 49 FROM “China reportedly to turn Lop Nor nuclear test desert into oasis,” Xinhua, 29 November 1997, 
in BBC, 3 December 1997 
105
 Nathan and Scobell, 205 
106
 Nathan and Scobell, 207 
Parrino 44 
 
resources.  Xinjiang’s natural resources provide the economic motive for Chinese migration to the 
region. 
 Since 1990 the ethnic tension in Xinjiang has been ever increasing.  It is characterized by on and 
off periods of ethnic violence by the Uyghurs, and the Chinese government’s suppression of separatist 
activities.  Xinjiang has also become more interesting to the western media because it features an 
interesting blend of China, Islam, terrorism and human rights violations.   It is difficult to get accurate 
information on the uprisings and protests because of China’s lack of transparency and the biased 
reporting by Uyghurs and Chinese alike.  The first violent outburst against the Chinese state was the 
Baren Uprising in April 1990.  It involved logistics and planning, beginning on April 5 with rebels 
besieging government houses in Baren, while another group burned a bus carrying policeman, killing the 
policeman with knives and seized their guns and ammunition.107  The rebels had to seize guns because 
they did not have the ability to purchase guns in Xinjiang (China has strict gun-control policies).  
However, Chinese sources did claim Uyghurs were able to purchase some weapons.108  It seems that 
towards the end of March there was a training camp to prepare rebels for the upcoming fight, and it 
appears that they were forced to act quicker on the plot than they planned because their plot was about 
to be discovered.109  The main issues that caused this uprising were the constant Han migration, and 
rumors that Beijing would extend the one-child policy to minority populations (including the Uyghurs).110 
 Following the Baren uprising, several more terrorist attacks would occur, with the next major 
attack being bus bombings in Urumqi on February 5, 1992.  Three would be killed and twenty-three 
injured.  According to the 2002 PRC white paper Chinese forces discovered more bombs in a cinema and 
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residential building that they defused.111  These attacks also showed signs of long-term organizational 
planning.112  This caused the Chinese government to enhance their efforts in suppressing separatist 
activities.  According to Justin V. Hastings in 1993 there were 76 separatist incidents, with 191 people 
arrested and 21 rebel cells uncovered.  1994 would be quieter with 30 separatist incidents.113  During 
these years there would be moderately planned minor bombings and assassinations.  On July 7, 1995 
demonstrations would occur in Khotan in response to the arrests of local imams.  To suppress the 
protests tear gas was used and protestors were beaten.  Official reports mention the injuries of 66 
government officials, but fail to mention the injuries of the protestors.114 
 Since 1990 Beijing had become increasingly worried about the situation in Xinjiang, and on 
March 19, 1996 a Politburo meeting discussed the problem.  They came to the conclusion that illegal 
religious activity and ethnic separatism were threating Xinjiang’s security, along with foreign influence 
and infiltration.  The following month China would launch a two-prong strategy to increase its hold over 
Xinjiang: it initiated an intense “Strike Hard” campaign aimed at harshly suppressing the separatist 
activities, and announced the official creation of the Shanghai Five Organization.  The Shanghai Five was 
a regional security organization between China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan committed 
to combating the three evils of “separatism, extremism, and terrorism.”  Uzbekistan would join in 2001, 
causing the organization to be renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  While the Strike 
Hard Campaign aimed at combatting the illegal religious and ethnic separatist activity that threated the 
Chinese state, the Shanghai Five was an attempt at improving Chinese relations with Central Asian states 
neighboring Xinjiang to earn their favor and prevent them from influencing the Uyghurs.  
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 In tune with classic insurgency and counter-insurgency behavior, the Strike Hard campaign 
caused an increase in insurgent behavior.  The policy of crackdowns naturally created a new set of 
grievances against the state.  The period of 1996-1998 would be characterized as the most intense for 
violent Uyghur behavior against the state.  The immediate months after the launching of the Strike Hard 
Campaign (April-June) would feature an immediate increase in logistically simple incidents such as 
assassinations and protests.115  This was most likely the immediate reaction to the Chinese behavior 
during the Strike Hard campaigns.  Protests would breakout in retaliation to Chinese arrests of Uyghurs.  
One such example was the February 1997 protests in Yining (Ghuljia), the “Ghuljia Incident,” in which 
Uyghurs protests resulted from several factors, most notably the crackdown on Uyghur mashrups.  From 
February 5-8 a cycle of Uyghur demonstration and Chinese repression ensued: protestors were arrested; 
tear gas, live ammunition, and dogs were reportedly used against Uyghurs; Uyghurs rioted torching 
vehicles and attacking Chinese police or Han residents; and the rioters carried banners and slogans 
calling for Uyghur equality and independence.116 The number of deaths and arrests are unknown, but 
the death total from this incident has been estimated around 10 people and thousands of individuals 
were arrested.  Some that were deemed responsible were executed, a theme in China’s crackdown on 
Uyghur unrest.  According to Amnesty International cases have been documented of detainees receiving 
frostbite after being hosed down in an open stadium.117  Soon after the Ghuljia Incident, bus bombings 
tied to Uyghur separatism occurred in February and March of 1997: on February 27, 1997 bombs 
exploded on three buses in the capital city of Urumqi, coinciding with the memorial ceremonies for 
Deng Xiaoping.  This event killed nine and wounded sixty-eight. On March 7 a bus in Beijing exploded 
that some attributed to Uyghur separatism, but this is highly speculative.118   
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 By mid-1998 violent actions undertaken by Uyghurs against China had died down and the Strike 
Hard campaign could be considered successful.  For the most part terrorist attacks would die down until 
July 2009.  This does not mean that during this time ethnic tension waned in Xinjiang.  According to 
James Millward even though there were no outbursts of violence, the interethnic relations between Han 
and Uyghurs were tenser than they were during the height of violence in 1997-1998.119  In fact they 
were more resentful than ever.  At the same time the imminent terrorist threat to the Chinese state was 
exaggerated by China.  This may be due to the fact that from Beijing’s perspective it works well for state-
nationalism to exaggerate the threat of ethnic separatism to the people.  In August 2008 there were two 
violent incidents against Chinese soldiers that seemed to take little logistical planning.120  On August 4, 
two Uyghurs stole a truck crashed into a group of soldiers; then threw homemade explosives and 
stabbed the victims.  Sixteen would be killed and sixteen wounded.  Six days later several Uyghurs stole 
taxis and used them to throw homemade explosives at symbols of Chinese repression, and economic 
exploitation: police cars, the Public Security Bureau, the industry and commerce building and several 
other buildings.  Several police officers would die.  In July 2009 ethnic violence would again outbreak as 
riots occurred between Uyghurs and Han stemming from anger over accusations of Uyghur men raping a 
Han woman at a factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong.  The riots would last from July 5 – July 8, 2009 
culminating in an official death toll of 197, making it the source of the most serious unrest in Xinjiang to 
date.  Again this featured violence that occurred without any logistical planning, but Xinjiang featured 
tremendous interethnic tension that the slightest event could spark mass violence.   
 China blamed external sources for instigating the July 2009 violence.  Whether it is true or not, 
the Chinese government constantly blames foreigners for instigating domestic violence within its 
territory, rather than admit its own suppression policies may be the cause of unrest.  This is in part due 
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to the memory of the century of humiliation and constant insecurity Chinese leaders have of foreigners 
meddling in their internal affairs.  The century of humiliation featured a constant interference in Chinese 
affairs by the imperial powers, and since 1949 China is vigilant of external factors causing internal 
disturbances.  China has tried to portray Rebiya Kadeer, the President of the World Uyghur Congress 
(international organization representing the interests of the Uyghur people worldwide), in a similar light 
to the Dalai Lama as an enemy of the state trying to separate territory from China.  However, she 
commands far less influence over the Uyghur people than the Dalai Lama does for Tibetans.  
Nonetheless the Chinese government accused her of planning the 2009 riots by spreading information 
about the Shaoguan incident through the internet and cell phones and encouraging violence.  Much like 
the Arab Spring, China believed that technology aided the separatist efforts of the Uyghur people.  China 
has always been concerned that technology could aid dissidents in arousing agitation against the 
Chinese state, thus it attempts to control the flow of information to the best of its ability.  Reporting on 
sensitive topics such as Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan are closely monitored.  According to web experts 
China is able to swiftly censor web information by temporarily closing unwanted websites for “technical 
maintenance.”121  They did this soon after the Urumqi riots in July 2009 and will continue to do so in the 
future. 
 In recent years, the conflict between Uyghur separatists and the Chinese state has expanded to 
outside Xinjiang.  On October 28, 2013, Uyghurs orchestrated a vehicular attack on Tiananmen Square 
that left two dead and over 40 injured that Beijing attributed to Uyghur separatism.  Beijing immediately 
reacted to the vehicular attack by arresting five suspects related to the crime.  One of the suspects, 
Yusup Umarniyaz, was from a predominately Uyghur town in Xinjiang that last June was the site of 
violence that left 27 people dead, including 10 police officers.122  In response to the Tiananmen attack, 
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the PLA stepped up its efforts in Xinjiang.  However this did not slow down attacks, and on November 
16, 2013 nine men armed with axes stormed a police station near the southwestern Xinjiang town of 
Selibuya.123  The government stated that all nine assailants died along with two people who assisted in 
the attack.124 Most recently on March 1, 2014 Uyghur separatists launched a knife-wielding attack at a 
railway station in the Chinese city of Kunming, Yunnan, which left 29 civilians dead.  One witness said 
“everyone ran.  There were knives everywhere and they began throwing at people.”125  All three attacks 
involve very simple weapons, the likely result of the difficulty to smuggle weapons into Xinjiang.  Some 
experts are saying that Uyghurs are attacking places outside Xinjiang because attacks within the region 
have little political impact and China proper has more lenient security.126   
China has also been able to take advantage of the post 9/11 world.  In October 2001, a month 
after 9/11, China claimed that there were several Uyghur terrorist movements within Xinjiang, thereby 
presenting its internal struggle against separatism as China also becoming a victim to global terrorism.127  
Beijing was also able to have the US place the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) on its list of 
terrorist organizations.  Beijing remains very worried that the global Islamic jihadi movement will enter 
into Xinjiang.  It fears influence, ideas, people and weapons being transported into Xinjiang from any of 
the countries bordering it: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia and 
Tajikistan.  China is especially worried about the borders that it shares with Central Asian Islamic 
countries that either have current jihad movements, or share sympathy to the Uyghur cause.  However, 
luckily for China the roughly 6,000 km of borders Xinjiang shares with the world are mountainous terrain 
that makes cross-border travel difficult.  The terrain is so difficult that only a few highways connect 
Xinjiang with the world, and many of these passes are only open seasonally.  There are six legal year 
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round border crossings: two in Kyrgyzstan and four in Kazakhstan.  There are nine seasonal border 
crossings: three in Kazakhstan, four in Mongolia, one in Pakistan, and one in Tajikistan.  Kazakhstan is 
the only Central Asian border with flat terrain thus, is the source for much of the trade that enters 
Xinjiang.128  This border also contains China’s oil pipeline that connects it to Central Asia and is the 
source of the only railway connection between Xinjiang and Central Asia.  Kyrgyzstan, though 
mountainous, does have two mountain passes that act as the only year-round legal connections Xinjiang 
has to the world besides Kazakhstan.  Pakistan’s Karakorum Highway is only open temporarily as it is 
closed much of the year due to snow.  It is after all the highest international paved highway in the world.  
Tajikistan’s seasonal border crossing legally opened in June 2004 following the construction of a road at 
Kulma Pass, but it is only open half the year. Finally, the four seasonal border crossings with Mongolia 
are not as important for the security situation in Xinjiang because the bulk of the Uyghur population 
lives in the western and southern portions of Xinjiang.129 
China’s border with Central Asian states is a relatively new phenomenon.  Following the collapse 
of the USSR n 1991, China quickly established border relations with the newly independent states of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  The USSR collapse presented China with an opportunity to regain 
34,000 square kilometers it had claimed in Central Asia because these newly independent states could 
not defend themselves against China’s stronger military force.  Instead, China sought to cooperate with 
these new states over territorial disputes in return for assistance on China’s security situation in 
Xinjiang.130  China sought to seek friendship with these three Central Asian states bordering Xinjiang 
because it believed that contesting disputed territory would harm its territorial integrity and undermine 
the security effort in Xinjiang.   
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With the USSR collapse, China and Kazakhstan inherited a 1,056 mile (1,700 km) border of which 
365 square miles (944 square kilometers) were in dispute.131   China immediately sought to end this 
border dispute through settlement and diplomatic means.  This culminated in a 1998 Sino-Kazakh accord 
with China gaining just over 43% of the disputed land and Kazakhstan retaining just under 57% of the 
land.132   China’s border dispute with Kyrgyzstan would be settled in 1999 with Kyrgyzstan ceding almost 
480 square miles (1,240 sq. km) to China.133   China and Tajikistan began settling the disputed territory 
along their 250 mile (400 km) border through negotiations in 1999 that the Tajikistan legislature finally 
ratified in January 2011.134   In dispute was 10,811 square miles (28,000 sq. km) of which Tajikistan in 
1999 agreed to cede 77 square miles (200 sq. km) which was then increased to 433 square miles (1,122 
sq. km) in a 2002 agreement.135   Like China’s agreement with Kazakhstan, China lost more land than it 
gained.   
 China’s territorial concessions of disputed territory to the Central Asian states are important in 
understanding their strategy for maintaining the territorial integrity of Xinjiang.  It showed that Beijing 
believes in order to secure Xinjiang, friendship and cooperation with Central Asia is imperative.  Friendly 
border relations help control the smuggling of weapons and prevent these states from aiding the Uyghur 
cause.  The territorial concessions are also important to understand the Chinese holistic strategy 
towards territorial integrity.  It showed that despite the century of humiliation that has haunted the 
Chinese perception of maintain territorial integrity, China was willing to negotiate on contested 
territory.  This may offer a glimpse of hope for the peaceful resolution of the current island disputes in 
the South and East China Sea.  However, these are two completely different scenarios in that the former 
contested land with Central Asia was of little strategic, symbolic or economic value to Beijing, and the 
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Central Asian states were weaker than China.  The Central Asian states had no goal of keeping China 
weak.    
 China secured cooperation with its new neighbors through the creation of the Shanghai Five in 
1996.  It is by no means an accident that its creation coincided with the launching of the 1996 Strike 
Hard campaign.  China’s interest in suppressing perceived anti-Chinese separatist movements and its 
relation with Central Asia are two sides of the same coin.  As mentioned earlier the organization would 
expand in 2001 to include Uzbekistan, which does not border Xinjiang, and thus was not included in the 
original five.  This increased the organization to six total members and the name was changed to the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  The SCO is effectively a Chinese led organization designed to 
combat the three evils of “separatism, extremism, and terrorism” that undermine its territorial integrity 
in Xinjiang.  Today the SCO also includes five “observer states” (India, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and 
Mongolia), two “dialogue partners” (Belarus and Sri Lanka) and two “guests” (AESEAN and 
Commonwealth of Independent States).  Obviously the SCO’s significance has grown beyond simply 
being an organization interested in managing cross-border ethnic movements.  It is currently a 
multilateral security organization in which its members reflect a shared value of stability, and share the 
common fears/concerns of Islamic militancy, U.S. hegemony/dominance, reduced U.S. military presence 
in the region (it condones US use of Central Asian bases for the war effort in Afghanistan but seek 
deadlines of ultimate withdrawal to prevent permanent bases) and color revolutions.136  Still, China’s 
main motive for creating the organization stemmed from maintaining its hold over Xinjiang and it 
remains Beijing’s primary focus within the SCO. 
 In 2004 the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) of the SCO officially opened in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan, where it functions as a permanent organ for all member states to share intelligence and 
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work together to combat the three evils.  RATS and the SCO are mainly financed by the three wealthiest 
members: Kazakhstan, Russia and China.  China sees Kazakhstan as especially important in its efforts to 
consolidate Xinjiang because the greatest concentration of Uyghurs outside Xinjiang lives in Kazakhstan, 
with a population of roughly 400,000 Uyghurs.137   Also as mentioned earlier, Kazakhstan is the main 
transport for cross border trade into Xinjiang because it is the only flat terrain that surrounds Xinjiang.  
Uyghur rebels looking to smuggle weapons and themselves usually cross this terrain.  Uyghurs need to 
smuggle weapons into China because guns are not readily available due to China’s strict gun control.  As 
a result smugglers are left with two options of transport into China: going around the legal checkpoints, 
or attempting to sneak weapons past legal checkpoints.  It is difficult to go outside the legal checkpoints 
because the treacherous terrain is extremely difficult to cross, raising the time and money it takes to 
transport weapons.  It may be impossible to have a support structure capable of accomplishing this.138  
Most are forced to sneak the weapons in through legal checkpoints.  Fortunately for China, the 
smugglers are limited in how many weapons they can transport at a time for fear of being discovered.139  
Thus the Uyghur separatist attempt is clearly limited in its ability to bring weapons into Xinjiang, limiting 
the ability of the Uyghurs to mount a sophisticated separatist campaign.   
 The Uyghur separatist attempt also seems to suffer from a lack of unity.  While there is a great 
deal of ethnic tension, it is not a unified violent force.  Beijing’s greatest fear will be if a Uyghur leader 
can unite the Uyghur tension against the Chinese state.  The ethnic divide is evident, and the situation in 
Xinjiang could be characterized as a volcano waiting to explode.  Chinese domestic upheaval during the 
century of humiliation illustrates how much more effective a domestic movement will be if the 
campaign is well organized under strong leadership.  Rebiya Kadeer is not a strong enough leader today 
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because she does not hold a great deal of influence over the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.  While much of the 
country featured domestic rebellions from 1850-1873, the Taiping rebellion was the most 
destructive/successful because it was well organized under Hong Xiuquan and bonded by a common 
ideology.  According to James Millward Uyghur, resistance to Beijing rule since the 19th century has been 
common, discontinuous and bonded by different ideologies.140  Although many would like to 
characterize Islam as the binding force that unites Uyghurs against Chinese rule, it is one of the many 
that has bonded Uyghurs throughout time.  The practice of Islam is, however, a symbol against the 
Chinese civic identity and makes Uyghurs different from Chinese.   
 Today Xinjiang is ripe with tension.  As of 2007, Xinjiang was home to roughly 20 million people, 
with the Uyghur population at 9.6 million, and the Han at 8.2 million.141  The rest is home to various 
minorities, most notably the Kazak at around 1 million people.  This is a tremendous disparity to the 
Xinjiang of 1949 which featured a population of roughly 3 million people, dominated by a Uyghur 
presence.  The Han influx is due to the creation of the 1954 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
(a quasi-military, quasi-business group dominated by the Han), the establishment of prison labor camps 
whose inmates stayed after being released from custody, the Han who were “sent down” during 
Cultural Revolution, and the current Chinese effort to bring development to Xinjiang.142  It seems that 
the development strategy to assimilate Xinjiang into China is not working, but actually fostering more 
resentment.  It appears that the Han are the ones that make money, not the Uyghurs, and this fuels an 
antagonistic nationalism over the perceived exploitation of Uyghur resources by the Chinese.  China has 
initiated affirmative action programs to help bring wealth to Uyghurs, but it still struggles to overcome 
the perception that the economy in Xinjiang is run by the Han.  The Han migration also makes the 
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Uyghurs fear they are losing their way of life, and their identity.  In fact some cities in Xinjiang have 
started to resemble the cities of Eastern China.143  The city designs look very Chinese.  
   In practice contemporary Xinjiang is an ethnically segregated province.  There is very little 
intermarriage or social activity among the groups.  Worse, the Han moving into Xinjiang today are less 
concerned about knowing or understanding Uyghur culture or identity than past migrants.144  It is 
different from other parts of Central Asia during the Soviet Union where different ethnicities 
intermarried with the Russians.  According to James Millward, the people of Xinjiang would be surprised 
to see the Central Asian ability to coincide, and Central Asia would be surprised by the segregation of 
the Xinjiang region.145  Most Uyghurs even run on a different time.  China operates under one time zone, 
commonly referred to as Beijing Time or China Standard Time (UTC +08:00) despite the fact that China 
geographically covers several different time zones.  This is part of China’s grand design of unity.  Most of 
Xinjiang unofficially operates in practice under “Urumqi Time” which is two hours behind Beijing.  Han 
Chinese generally uses Beijing time, while Uyghurs generally use Urumqi Time. 
 In conclusion, China is struggling to consolidate Xinjiang into its territory.  Through a 
combination of carrots and sticks China is trying to assimilate the Uyghurs into the Chinese state.  This is 
met mostly with resistance because Uyghurs wish to maintain their Uyghur identity, and currently fear 
that the Han Chinese will destroy their way of life.  In many ways China is, not because China hates the 
Uyghur way of life but that it is antagonistic to the state attempt to unify its peoples.  Since Xinjiang is 
legally Chinese territory, Beijing is trying to influence Uyghurs and incorporate them into the Chinese 
way of life.  Uyghur identity is repressed because it is seen as separatist towards Beijing’s goals.  The 
unity of the Chinese state and state nationalism directly coincides with Han nationalism and Han way of 
life.  In Xinjiang, Uyghur and other local languages have been phased out of instruction to become 
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second languages in they were taught at all.  This is important because Chinese identity is strongly 






China’s territorial claim to Tibet has drawn much criticism from around the world.  After their 
claim to Taiwan, Tibet is the most popular depiction of an over-aggressive Chinese state.  However, from 
China’s viewpoint, there is nothing aggressive or domineering about their sovereignty over Tibetan land.  
Like Xinjiang, Beijing maintains that Tibet has been historically part of China.  The Tibet Autonomous 
Region of China (TAR) contains roughly 471,000 square miles of land on China’s southwestern frontier 
bordering India, Nepal, and Bhutan.  Roughly 92% of the TAR’s 3 million people are ethnic Tibetan, 
leaving Tibet with a much different demographic scene when compared to Xinjiang.  However, the 
Tibetan nation is not limited to just the TAR, and is roughly twice the size of the TAR extending into 
ethnic Tibetan areas in four other Chinese provinces: Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai.147  Currently 
there is tension between Tibetan nationalism and Chinese state-nationalism; along with the Tibetan call 
for independence, and PRC effort to assimilate Tibet into China.   
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 The complex historical relationship between China and Tibet is based upon the fact that Tibet 
has long been subordinate to Chinese rule, but has usually operated independently.  China’s territorial 
claim to Tibet originates from the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) when both China and Tibet were ruled by 
the Mongols.  Genghis Khan began the conquest of China by attacking the Jurchen’s in Manchuria who 
had killed his father, and his grandson Kublai Khan completed it.  Genghis Khan, and the Mongol Khans 
who succeeded him, acquired much of Asia through conquests and ruled through the appointments of 
military governors to maintain the peace.  Tibet was an exception to this rule and allowed to be ruled 
internally by the Buddhists of the Sakya Sect and was not subject to military garrisons.148  The period of 
Mongol rule brought to Tibet the so-called “priest-patron” relationship between Tibet and China where 
the Sakya sect ruled Tibet.   Many contemporary Tibetans like to believe the rule was limited to this 
“cho-yon” (“priest-patron”) relationship as seen by Kublai Khan’s appointment of Pagma to handle 
Buddhist affairs across the country.149  The rule was not limited to the priest-patron relationship and 
Tibet was subject to Mongol political and military rule as witnessed by Mongol troops being ordered into 
Tibet to stabilize it.150  However, the relationship is not as politically subordinate as Chinese historians 
and scholars depict it.151 
 In 1368 the Ming Dynasty would overthrow the Yuan Dynasty and found their capital at Nanjing.  
This would be the first ethnic Han-Chinese dynasty to rule over a unified China since the fall of the Tang 
Dynasty.   The Ming was also more interested in domestic politics than maintaining an empire beyond 
China.152  Tibet’s relationship with China during the Ming Dynasty is also interpreted differently by 
Tibetans and Chinese.  Like the Yuan Dynasty, the official history of the Ming Dynasty places Tibet 
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outside of the geography of Ming China.153  The Ming would inherit the Yuan’s relationship with Tibet, 
but kept this relationship superficial because they lacked the will or need to impose the level of 
dependency Tibet placed on the Yuan.154  The early Ming was mostly interested in Tibet because of their 
relationship with the Mongols who were the greatest security threat to the Ming.  Tibetans and 
Mongolians shared the Tibetan Buddhist religion (from Yuan dynasty) that translated into a friendly 
alliance.  Once the Mongol threat passed, the Ming lost interest in Tibet and did little to enforce their 
claim over Tibet.155  The Ming would impose titles on Buddhist lamas but even this seemed to be merely 
superficial.  This is often used by Chinese sources to provide evidence for China’s historical sovereignty 
over Tibetan affairs.  However, according to Warren W. Smith Jr, “Despite later Chinese claims, Ming 
patronage of Tibetan lamas and their award of meaningless titles and non-existent officials positions can 
hardly be said to be the equivalent of actual Ming authority over Tibet or evidence that Tibet was a ‘part 
of China’ during the Ming.”156  Moreover it is likely that the Ming’s patronage of Tibetan lamas were 
more intended to stabilize border regions and protect trade routes than to impose political and military 
control on Tibet.157 
 The Mongol threat to Chinese security is a recurring theme throughout Chinese history.  This 
threat would continue while the Manchurian Qing Dynasty ruled China from 1644-1911.  Again the 
relationship with lamas would be important because they served as spiritual inspirations to the warlike 
Mongols who practiced Tibetan Buddhism.  Emperor Kangxi (ruled 1662-1722) would ask the Dalai Lama 
on several occasions to calm down Mongolian princes or act as a mediator in between them.158  Tibet 
would also recognize Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, which PRC scholars argue that this is indication of 
Tibet’s political submission to the Chinese emperor but most scholars outside the PRC contend that this 
                                                          
153
 Authenticating Tibet, 20 
154
 Smith, 103 
155
 Smith, 105 
156
 Smith, 105 
157
 Wolff, 79 
158
 Authenticating Tibet, 23, Anne Chayet 
Parrino 60 
 
relationship was mostly ceremonial.159  The Qing influence in Tibet would be the strongest of China’s 
dynasties, and would lay the foundation for the PRC’s interest in Tibet. 
 When the Mongolian threat died down after tribes submitted to the Qing, Tibet lost its strategic 
diplomatic importance and became merely one of China’s frontier borderlands.160  This historical shift in 
Tibetan-Chinese relations is usually dated to 1720.  At this time Emperor Kangxi ordered Manchu troops 
into Tibetan territory to expel the Zunghar Mongols (leaders of a major inner Asia steppe empire) who 
invaded Tibet, and escort the Seventh Dalai Lama into Lhasa.  They entered Tibet as liberators from the 
Zunghar Mongols and the supporters of the Seventh Dalai Lama.161  The early eighteenth century had 
been marked by political upheaval in Tibet since the death of the fifth Dalai Lama.  The sixth Dalai Lama 
appeared to have been a poor spiritual leader (although a great poet) and refused to take the vows to 
be a monk.  The Zunghars had invaded in 1717 and although they were able to control Lhasa they were 
left without the legitimacy to rule that the title of Dalai Lama.162  The effective expulsion of the Zunghars 
from Tibet marked the beginning of the Qing’s domination in the region.  In 1721 Tibet would reorganize 
the Tibetan government under the guidance of the Qing military, with an amban to conduct Tibetan 
foreign relations directly under Qing supervision.163 
 The Qing would again constantly intervene in Tibet, most notably in 1786 when the Nepalese 
Kingdom of Ghurka invaded.  This would be the fourth time in less than a century that the Qing had 
intervened in Tibet.164  After that, Tibet would become part of the Great Game between competing 
imperial powers Russia and Great Britain while the Qing slowly watched its influence decline in Tibet.  
The decline of China’s influence throughout the 19th century directly resulted from the diminishing Qing 
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power.   Great Britain did acknowledge that the Qing government had the right to make treaties for 
Tibet in part because so little information was known about Tibet that Britain assumed China ruled it 
directly.165  Eventually British influence would enter Tibet following the 1876 Chefoo Convention which 
granted Britain the right to an exploratory mission under Colonel Macauley.  Tibet became more worried 
about British influence than they were of other foreign powers.  By 1899 Lord Curzon would become the 
viceroy of India and he desperately sought to seek out trading privileges in Tibet.  This led to the British 
invasion of Tibet in 1904 under the command of Colonel Francis Younghusband, which culminated in the 
1904 Lhasa Convention with the British being granted their trading privileges.  This ended Tibet’s period 
of international isolation, exposed the myth of Chinese authority over Tibet, and gave the Tibetans an 
exposure to the outside world.166  However, following the fall of the Qing during the 1911 revolution, 
Tibet began to perceive Great Britain as capable of guaranteeing their independence. 
 Following the collapse of the Qing, Tibet proclaimed itself to be an independent state.  They 
expelled all Chinese officials and troops from the region in 1913, allowing Tibet to function 
independently for the first time since the Qing arrived in 1720.  Great Britain would function as a 
protector of Tibetan independence.  In 1914 the Simla Agreement demarcated the McMahon Line as the 
boundary separating India and Tibet.  Tibetans site this as an indication of Tibetan autonomy from 
China.  The Chinese position is that Tibetan representatives did not have the legal standing to sign such a 
document because China exercised control over Tibet’s external relations.167  The Chinese state was in 
feeble condition in 1914, and the representatives at the conference initialed but did not sign the 
agreement.  The thirteenth Dalai Lama would also re-enter Tibet, following his flight to India after the 
British invaded, and function as a leader of the Tibetan people.  No Chinese official would return until 
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the Thirteenth Dalai Lama died in 1933.168  He strengthened the Tibetan army to deter invasion, being 
fearful that China would invade and the “red ideology” would destroy his precious Buddhism as it did in 
Mongolia.169   
 After World War II Great Britain abandoned its empire in India, thus losing interest in ensuring 
Tibetan security. Great Britain believed that the responsibility to protect Tibetan independence would 
become India’s.  Unfortunate for Tibetans, Prime Minister Nehru was convinced by Mao Zedong that the 
Chinese would settle the Tibetan question peacefully.  They did not, and invaded Tibet on October 7, 
1950, the same day UN Forces under General MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea.  
Mao believed it to be strategically important for China to rule Tibet, and not foreign powers.  Any simple 
look at a map will illustrate the geopolitical importance of Tibet. The Tibetan Plateau was in fact China’s 
“soft underbelly” bordering the provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan.170  Due to the focus 
on the Korean War, along with the vacuum of British protection in Tibet, Tibet was left without 
international help.  El Salvador requested the UN General Assembly place Mao’s invasion on the agenda 
at the United Nations, but solving the Tibet Question was postponed to focus on Korea.171  Despite the 
Thirteenth Dalai Lama’s strengthening of Tibetan forces, they were no match for the PLA and sent a 
delegation to Beijing on April 2, 1951, reaching an agreement on May 23 of that same year.  Here 
delegated signed the infamous “Seventeen-point Agreement,” stating Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, 
with Tibet enjoying some autonomy.   The agreement “committed Beijing to allow religious freedom, 
recognized the role of the Dalai Lama, promised that the central authorities would not alter the political 
system and gave Beijing control of the territory’s external relations.”172  Over time the Seventeen-point 
Agreement would become little more than a piece of paper.  Today, religious practice is closely 
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scrutinized, the Dalai Lama is exiled in India, and the political system in Tibet has totally changed.    
 Mao Zedong originally intended to enact a “Go Slow” policy in Tibet.  Although he hated Tibet’s 
feudalistic society he realized that the shift towards socialism would have to be a gradual one.  Mao 
wanted to earn the favor of Tibetan elites first and maintain the existing political structure to secure the 
PRC’s territorial claim.  Mongolia and Xinjiang were quickly integrated as Autonomous Regions but 
Beijing recognized that they needed to adopt a more cautious position to gradually gain the confidence 
of Tibetans.173  Thus the Preparatory Committee for the eventual establishment of the Autonomous 
Region of Tibet (PCART) was established as a transition to the eventual establishment of Tibet as an 
Autonomous Region.  The Dalai Lama was appointed Chairman of the PCART, with PLA General Zhang 
Guohua as the Deputy Chairman, whom in practice ran the PCART affairs.174  This all changed following 
the 1959 Tibetan rebellion.  The unrest that caused the rebellion began in 1952 in the Kham and Amdo 
Tibetan regions that lay outside the TAR.  These regions were exempt from the “go slow” policy and 
were experiencing the changes of communist governance that affected their Tibetan identity.  These 
areas began witnessing democratic reforms in 1956, and by September 95% of the Tibetan areas in 
Sichuan had completed the reforms.175  Reform often consisted of “liberating” the Tibetan people who 
were perceived to be serfs victimized by feudalism.  The TAR was not experiencing these political 
changes.  An example of this 1956 unrest includes the Kanding revolt which broke out in Sichuan after 
the PLA sieged a Buddhist monastery.  Fighting consisted of 10,000 Khampas fighting for several months 
before it was eventually suppressed.176 
 In 1959 the rebellion spread into Lhasa.  These rebellions were nationalistic in nature, but 
received a great deal of external support by the CIA.  This has left a lasting impression in Beijing of 
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foreigners meddling in their affairs to keep China weak, already haunted by the memory of the century 
of humiliation.  The CIA assistance in Tibet was part of the Cold War policy to contain communism 
worldwide.  The CIA trained Khampas in Colorado for insertion into Tibet under the operation ST Circus, 
and spending millions of dollars on weapons for Tibetan guerillas.  The weapons airdropped into Tibet 
far exceed the current weapons being smuggled from Central Asia into Xinjiang.  The CIA even paid 
$180,000 directly to the Dali Lama.177  In the midst of the rebellion the fourteenth Dalia Lama retreated 
to India (after rumors of a plot to kill him surfaced) where he remains today.  Also, Premier Zhou Enlai 
announced that China no longer felt bound to the Seventeen-point Agreement , proclaimed it invalid, 
and China thus set out to truly transition Buddhist, Tibet into a Chinese Communist state.178 
 The suppression of the 1959 rebellion caused an increase in Tibetan nationalism.  Tibetan 
nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon that like mainland China developed during the late 19th 
century.  It was not aroused during the period of Qing intervention in Tibet.  According to Warren W. 
Smith, “Ch’ing [Qing] domination of Tibet had only a small effect on the Tibetan sense of national 
identity and it did little to arouse Tibetan nationalism.  However, when the Ch’ing protectorate over 
Tibet was later interpreted by the Chinese as the equivalent of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Tibetan 
nationalism was around in response.”179  This remains consistent with the findings in Xinjiang, where 
nationalism seemed to arise in response to PRC policies.  The difference here, however, is that Tibet 
functioned as a de facto independent state from the fall of the Qing to the PRC conquest in 1950-1951.  
Maoist policies would further increase this drive towards local, ethnic nationalism.  It appears that 
China’s policy to create a unified state with the inclusion of these ethnic frontiers has been the driving 
force of this nationalism.  It is paradoxical because ethnic nationalism is a response to Chinese state led 
nationalism, and Chinese state led nationalism is an attempt to create a strong unified state that will 
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enable China to reclaim their presence as the dominant power in East Asia.  Ethnic nationalism today is a 
threat to China’s territorial integrity. 
 The suppression of the 1959 rebellion resulted in the fleeing of roughly between 50-70,000 of 
Tibetans between 1959-1965 to India, Nepal and Bhutan.180  Most Tibetans left after China’s anti-
rebellion campaign.181  The anti-rebellion campaign actually did more to damage Chinese-Tibetan 
relations than the actual uprising, and it was often the first contact most Tibetans had with Chinese.182  
The campaign was intended to receive cooperation for Chinese rule and get Tibetans involved with 
political life.  Often those who were involved in the revolt were accused of “betraying the motherland.”  
Tsering Shakya summarizes the perceptions regarding betrayal beautifully: 
What the Chinese saw as the most traitorous crime, ‘betraying the Motherland’, was an 
empty slogan to the majority of Tibetans who had never looked towards China as a 
‘Motherland’ and to whom the Chinese were foreigners as much as the British or the 
Indians, with an ideology as alien as Christianity.  To the Tibetans the revolt was never 
seen as betrayal.183   
Land reform would be introduced to overthrow the feudal system of Tibet and its inequalities.  
However Mao still believed he needed aristocratic power, so the ones that did not aid in the rebellion 
did not originally have their land taken from them.  While this land reform did change the Tibetan way 
of life, by many respects the Tibetan system was backwards and in need of reform.  So some peasants 
welcomed the Maoist reform the aimed at equality and wealth distribution.  The Dalai Lama himself was 
attracted to the economic and social ideals of Marxism.184  However by 1961, the last year of the post-
Great Leap Forward famine, Tibetans could not ignore that Chinese communist rule in Tibet had failed to 
produce a socialist paradise but suffering as food production would be confiscated to feed the 
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Chinese.185  Many would also be imprisoned without justifiable cause.  The Tibetan Government in exile 
estimated 173,000 deaths in prisons and labor camps, while the Panchen Lama estimated that 10-15% 
of the Tibetan population had been imprisoned (he said 5% in his 70,000 character petition to Chairman 
Mao because he claims he did not have the courage to state such a high figure).186  As a result of the 
70,000 character petition he would be purged in 1964, causing him to be imprisoned and tortured for 
some time.  The following year Tibet officially became an autonomous region.  However, the worst was 
yet to come for Tibetans. 
The Cultural Revolution (roughly 1966-1976) turned into a total attack on Tibetan culture.  It was 
an attack on traditional Chinese culture and Tibet was not exempt from this assault.  The attack on Tibet 
was even worse than it was in Xinjiang.  The Cultural Revolution in Tibet would be officially launched on 
August 25, 1966 when Tibetan and Chinese Red Guards attacked Tsuglhakhang (or Jokhang), Lhasa’s 
Central Cathedral.  Some relics were removed before the attack on the Panchen Lama’s orders, while all 
frescoes and scriptures were destroyed in the attack.187  On August 27, Red Guards would distribute this 
four-page pamphlet designed to influence Tibetans to give up their old feudal way of life, and move 
towards a socialist society: 
(1) Bowing and sticking tongue out as a sign of respect should be abolished, as these are 
the signs of feudal oppression of the proletariat. 
(2) All observance of religious festivals should be abolished. 
(3) All feudal names of parks and streets should be changed (for example the Norbu 
Linga [Norbulingka] should be named the Peoples’ Park). 
(4) All large and small chotens must be destroyed. 
(5) All books praising the idealism and feudalism should be prohibited. 
(6) All mani walls, prayers flags and incense burners should be destroyed. 
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(7) No one should recite prayers, circumambulate, prostrate.  People should not consult 
oracles and diviners. 
(8) People should destroy all photographs of the Dalai and the Panchen. 
(9) All photo praising revisionists, feudalism or reactionaries should be destroyed. 
(10) All monasteries and temples apart from those that are protected by the  
government should be converted for general public use. 
(11)The Tibet Daily and Lhasa radio must use the language of the proletariat and 
expunge the language of aristocracy.  Accordingly, Tibetan grammar should be 
reformed. 
(12) All Muslims should also embrace the new society and destroy the old traditions. 
(13) The People’s Park, formerly the Norbu Linga, should be opened to the public for 
recreation. 
(14) There should be greater political and ideological education among the monks and 
nuns. They should be allowed to abandon their religious duties and vows without 
pressure from the monasteries. 
(15) Monks and nuns should be allowed to marry and they must engage in productive 
labor. 
(16) The exploiting class should be subjected to labor education and a close watch 
should be kept on their conduct. 
(17) Feudal practices, such as giving parties, exchanging presents and kha-ta should be 
stopped. 
(18) Feudal marriage practices, such as one man having two wives, one woman having 
two husbands, father and son sharing a wife, two sisters sharing one husband and two 
brothers sharing a wife should be eradicated. 
(19) Scientific education should be propagated among the people.  Films which teach 
scientific education should be shown. 
(20) All stray dogs in Lhasa must be destroyed and people should not keep dogs and cats 
in the house.188 
 This Red Guard pamphlet summarizes the Chinese perspective on what needed to be 
accomplished in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution: abruptly transition Tibet from a backwards feudal 
society into a communist state, socially educate the people to believe the communist ideology, and 
destroy the Buddhist religion.  From the Tibetan perspective the Cultural Revolution was designed to 
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destroy the Tibetan way of life, and this further increased the nationalistic sentiment.  40,000 portraits 
of Mao Zedong would be distributed throughout Lhasa demonstrating the supremacy of Mao over the 
Dalai Lama, Tibetan streets were renamed in favor of national Chinese names, and the PRC state flag 
would replace the Buddhist prayer flags.189  Also included in this changing face of identity were the 
Tibetan marriage practices: allowing monks to marry and the practices of fraternal polyandry and 
polygamy.  Fraternal polyandry still exists to some degree today, and derived from the idea of keeping 
property within the same family unit. 
 Especially targeted for destruction during the Cultural Revolution was Tibetan Buddhism.  The 
systematic attack on Buddhism during this time was horrific.  It would also announce the greatest 
dissatisfaction towards Chinese rule because for Tibetans this was the greatest source of Tibetan 
identity.  Tibetan Buddhism continues to be at the center of Tibetan identity, and nationalism today.  
During the Cultural Revolution roughly 6,000 monasteries were destroyed, and the remnants of this 
destruction are still visible.190  Due to the ideology of the Cultural Revolution to be utopian and anti-
religion, it seemed that everything associated with the Buddhist religion was dismantled to be practically 
used by the Communists.  Buddhist scriptures were burnt and converted into toilet paper or shoe lining, 
timber and stones from monasteries and temples would become the building blocks for Chinese offices, 
housing and PLA barracks; religious mani stones became walkways so that Tibetans could desecrate 
their own religion as they walked, or used to construct public toilets; private religious shrines were 
destroyed while all religious objects that held monetary value would be shipped back to mainland 
China.191   
 The 1969 Nyemo Revolt would take place in the midst of the Cultural Revolution.  Although 
Tibetans and Chinese both use this revolt to indicate separatist/independence implications, its motives 
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were more so a reaction to the chaotic Cultural Revolution than a search for Tibetan nationalist identity 
free from Chinese rule.  Regardless it is the “second Tibetan revolt” and deserves to be mentioned here 
for its contribution to nationalism, and especially its resentment to Chinese rule.  It was led by a nun, 
Thrinley Choedron, and she and her supporters targeted “enemies of the faith”: Chinese Cadres and 
Tibetans who supported them.  In some ways this crazy, frenzy attack sounds similar to the Boxer 
Rebellion when Boxers attacked foreigners and Chinese Christian converts.  During the outbreak she 
attacked the Communist headquarters in Nyemo, slaughtered many who worked there, and chopped off 
the hands of Tibetans who worked there.192  After the PLA suppressed her activities, Thrinley and fifteen 
of her followers would be publicly executed in Lhasa, demonstrating Beijing’s supreme authority over 
Tibetan affairs.193 
 The Cultural Revolution devastated Tibet.  In 1979-1980 the Dalai Lama sent an investigative 
team into Tibet to examine changes that had occurred since he left in exile twenty years before.194  This 
search committee was shocked by the terrible economic conditions, but there were calls for a 
nationalistic independence movement.  There existed a split amongst Tibetans on whether to solve the 
issue violently or peacefully.  The Dalai Lama ultimately rejected violent measures for a strategy of non-
violence that included internationalizing the issue.  The Dalai Lama would travel abroad to spread 
knowledge about the situation in Tibet, and use foreign diplomatic pressure along with the human rights 
movement to vilify the Chinese.  By internationalizing the Tibet issue, he effectively drew sympathy of 
many worldwide as Tibet grew in the consciousness of the west.  Most importantly he made the issue of 
Tibet a sticky-point between the western countries.  However, he also withdrew the calls for Tibetan 
statehood out of pragmatic necessity. 
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 The 1980s would feature a dramatic departure from the Maoist leadership as Hu Yaobang took 
over the policymaking towards Tibet.  From the perspective of Tibetans and the human rights 
movement, this period of time marks the long bright spot of Chinese policies toward Tibetans.  From the 
perspective of Chinese, some saw Hu’s policies as too soft because from a state perspective, allowing 
ethnic nationalism to foster is a threat to your own state-led nationalism.  Regardless, Hu liberalized the 
policies towards Tibet (as he did in Xinjiang) and called for a “Tibetanization” of the cadres.  He believed 
part of the problem was that Tibetans were not ruling their own land, and tried to promote ethnic 
Tibetans within the party leadership.  The PLA would also be educated on Tibetan culture and religion to 
better understand Tibetan identity.  On the thirtieth anniversary of the Seventeen-point Agreement 
(1981) he apologized for China’s past mistakes and announced a new beginning in Tibet.195  Most 
importantly he realized that what bothered the Tibetans the most were the restrictions on their practice 
of Buddhism and the Cultural Revolution failed to assimilate Tibetans into the communist lifestyle.  This 
is a theme we have noted throughout Tibetan-Chinese relations.  Tibetans want to be Tibetans, not 
Chinese.  A major part of this Tibetan identity is Tibetan Buddhism.  Whereas for the Uyghurs in Xinjiang 
the practice of Islam makes them different from the Chinese, Buddhism is Tibetan identity and not 
merely a distinction from the Chinese identity.  Practice of religion in Tibet is far more sacred than 
religion in Xinjiang. 
 It has been noted that much of Tibetan nationalism stems from Chinese policies that were 
perceived to be attacking Tibetan identity.  However, the liberalization under Hu Yaobang did not seem 
to pacify the Tibetans nationalistic conscience.  While we can easily argue that Chinese suppression is 
the main root for Tibetan nationalism, how then did the nationalism stay alive during Hu’s period of 
liberalization?  The answer most likely lies in the fact that the damage inflicted on Tibet caused wounds 
too deep for liberalization to heal.  In 1987 monk-led protests began and the tension culminated in 
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martial law from March 7, 1989 until April 30, 1990.196  Martial law was enacted by Deng Xiaoping, and 
continued by Jiang Zemin.  The arrests of monks by Chinese led for ordinary Tibetans to protest against 
the Chinese, thus causing China to enact martial law.  This also marks the current pattern of 
insurrection/repression in Tibet: monks protest, China arrests the monks for protesting, lay Tibetans 
protest the Chinese for arresting monks, and then China arrests more Tibetans.  Deng Xiaoping 
concluded that Hu’s 1980s liberalization policies of catering to Tibet as a special region needed to end if 
stability and unity of the Chinese nation was to be kept.197  It is also important to understand that China 
proper was simultaneously trying to find its own identity as it shifted away from Maoist communism 
towards an open economy with Western influence, while trying to prevent western influence from 
undermining the strength of the Communist party.  The infamous incident at Tiananmen Square 
occurred during this period, on June 4, 1989.  Ultimately martial law would be lifted on Tibet because of 
United States pressure, and Jiang Zemin’s desire to help improve US-Chinese relations.198  Recently, on 
November 20, 2013, Spain’s National Court issued an arrest warrant for Jiang Zemin and four other top 
officials for their human rights violations towards Tibet.199  This is purely symbolic, but it does note the 
interest the West has in Tibet, most likely due to the Dalai Lama’s internationalization of the issue.  It 
also undoubtedly helps fuel China’s perception that the west is interested in containing China to keep it 
weak. 
 Major Tibetan insurrection would not breakout again until 2008.  The 2008 rebellion was the 
most widespread unrest by Tibetans since the infamous 1959 insurrection.200  The PLA put down the 
rebellion through its large military garrison in Tibet which also put down the revolts of 1959, 1969, and 
1989.  The 2008 insurrection began with several hundred monks from the Dpreprung Monastry calling 
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for a relaxing of religious restraints and the release of imprisoned monks while they marched into Lhasa 
on the 49th anniversary of the 1959 uprising.201  As would be expected when the police tried to suppress 
the protests, ordinary Tibetans attacked them.  It should also not be surprising that China clamped down 
on these protests because the monks were not just calling for an improvement on policies towards 
Tibetans; they were celebrating an anniversary of a rebellion against the People’s Republic of China.  By 
March 14 the protests turned into ethnic conflict when Tibetans lit Chinese shops on fire and attacked 
ethnic Han’s in Lhasa.202  Unlike the 1959 protests, the 2008 insurrection began in the TAR and spread to 
ethnic Tibet areas outside the TAR in the regions of Kham and Amdo.   By March 16 these regions 
protested against Chinese rule and called for Tibetan independence.203   
 Since 2008 unrest in Tibet has mostly been seen my monks self-immolating themselves.  That 
being said there have been 120 attempted self-immolation incidents by Tibetan monks since 2009.204  
The first self-immolation was by a young monk named, Tapey, in Sichuan province.  Tapey would survive 
and many monks since have set themselves on fire in acts of protest against the Chinese state.  In 
response to the wave of self-immolations, the PLA cracked down harder.  Most of the self-immolations 
have been occurring outside the TAR at ethnic Tibetan areas in Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu.  According 
to one source covering Tapey’s town in Sichuan province:   
Chinese officials ordered the People’s Armed Police to surround the monastery; built a 
wall to cut off a rear entrance; banned all religious activities; smashed photographs of 
the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader; forced monks to attend patriotic re-
education sessions; cut off Internet access; and barred pilgrims from entering. They also 
took away 300 monks in a nighttime raid; many of them have not returned.205 
China of course likes to blame the Dalai Lama for orchestrating these self-immolations.  However, the 
Dalai Lama has spoken out against the self-immolations and has urged the monks to stop.  The Dalai 
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Lama has even stated that he believes they are not working to provide more lenient Chinese policies for 
the Tibetans.  The Dalai Lama has always been an advocate of non-violence and way will not orchestrate 
self-immolations, although he has complemented the monks on their courage to perform such acts. 
 The current Dalai Lama is 78 years old.  It will be interesting to see who succeeds him as the 
fifteenth Dalai Lama.  There has been talk of the next Dali Lama being a woman or the title been 
disbanded.  China has also insisted that they will pick and appoint the next Dali Lama.  There are four 
possible scenarios regarding the next Dali Lama: there being no Dali Lama; there being two Dali Lamas, 
one appointed by China and one living in exile; a female Dali Lama appointed by him; or the leader of 
another Tibetan Buddhist lineage inheriting the role.206  Regardless it should be a process watched 
carefully, especially if Beijing appoints the Dali Lama.  This may only create resentment against China for 
further trying to destroy Tibetan identity.  It also remains to be seen who will become the Panchen 
Lama, the second highest lama in Tibetan Buddhism.  The last Panchen Lama died in 1989, and it took six 
years for the Dali Lama to appoint a young boy as the eleventh Panchen Lama.   Following the 
announcement, Chinese authorities took the boy into custody and his whereabouts are unknown.  
Chinese officials were furious at the Dalai Lama, and then held its own ceremony in Lhasa as they 
selected a boy to be the next Panchen Lama.  His education is currently being supervised so that Beijing 
can control Tibetan leadership.   If China tries similar tricks following the appointment of the next Dalai 
Lama, Tibetans were sure to be agitated.      
  






Hong Kong and Macau:  
207 
 Hong Kong and Macau are two small Chinese territories that were acquired by imperial 
European powers through unequal treaties during the century of humiliation.  Both constitute Han 
majorities, thus the People’s Republic of China claimed that the territory was rightfully theirs in 1949.  
Hong Kong would eventually be returned to China in 1997 and Macao in 1999.  While China always 
maintained that the territories were in fact Chinese territory it acted with little urgency to regain these 
territories.  Military force was never used to take the territories away from Great Britain or Portugal.  
China’s decision to not make the issue an instant priority was likely influenced by the fact that both 
territories were too small to be considered an independent state.208 
 Great Britain acquired the territories of Hong Kong through three treaties during the century of 
humiliation: in the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing Britain received the island of Hong Kong; in the 1860 
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Convention of Peking Britain received a small section of fertile farmland on the southern end of the 
Kowloon peninsula; and in 1898 Britain received more territory on the Kowloon Peninsula called the 
“New Territories.”  The “New Territories” would constitute roughly 90% of the Hong Kong Colonial 
territory.  Unlike the other 10% it was administered by the British on a 99- year lease.  The rest of the 
colony was to be possessed in perpetuity.  The British had tried to renegotiate a continuation of the 
lease, but Chinese leaders insisted on the return of sovereignty to China.  Eventually Great Britain would 
return the territory after the lease ran out, along with the land it had legally possessed in perpetuity. 
 According to M. Taylor Fravel, China choose to adopt a delaying strategy towards the eventual 
reunification for four reasons: First, China had local military superiority over the British; Second, Chinese 
leaders believed Taiwan to be the more important dispute that needed to be consolidated first; Third, 
Hong Kong provided mainland China with tremendous economic benefits that pressuring Hong Kong’s 
return to the mainland could jeopardize; and Fourth China feared that an aggressive policy towards 
Hong Kong could result in a US military intervention.209  A fifth and obvious reason for China’s decision 
to delay was that Britain’s ninety-nine year lease on the New Territories would expire in 1997.  The New 
Territories were not owned in perpetuity.  International law would mandate the return of the New 
Territories to China in 1997, and China could wait until then to consolidate the other 10% of the British 
colony.  Had the entire Hong Kong territory been ceded to Great Britain, China may have chosen a 
different strategy towards reunifying Hong Kong with the mainland.   
 At the conclusion of the Civil War China elected to not seize Hong Kong despite the military 
capacity to do so.  In fact the PLA was ordered to not move within 25 miles of the territory.210  It soon 
became the official policy of the PRC to not abrogate the unequal treaties that ceded the territory to 
Great Britain.  They would delay unification until the lease on the New Territories ran out.  In October 
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1955 Premier Zhou Enlai privately met with the governor of Hong Kong, Sir Alexander Grantham, in 
which Zhou insisted that Britain not foster democracy or allow foreign militaries to use the island as a 
military base; while not obstructing China’s economic interests or permit KMT activities against the 
mainland.211  Following Nixon’s trip to China and the normalization of Chinese relations with Britain in 
1972, Hong Kong’s future status remained untouched.  The post-1997 status of Hong Kong would not be 
discussed between Britain and China until the British raised the possibility of extending the lease in 
1982.  In 1982 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher flew to China intent on convincing Deng Xiaoping for 
continual British administration of the island.  However Deng remained stern that Hong Kong is a 
Chinese territory and refused to budge an inch on the issue of Chinese sovereignty of the island.  
Eventually the British acquiesced on their position and gave in to Deng’s demand to also return the 10% 
of Hong Kong ceded to Great Britain by the Treaty of Nanjing and Convention of Peking.  Great Britain 
knew it could not defend the island militarily from China, and since the 1950s all of Hong Kong’s drinking 
water came from the Province of Guangdong.    
 In 1984 the two countries released the Sino-Joint Declaration of 1984 in which the entire Hong 
Kong colony would be unified with the mainland on July 1, 1997.  To appease the British, the people of 
Hong Kong, investors, and encourage the eventual reunification of Taiwan, China agreed that Hong Kong 
would enter the PRC as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) for fifty years under the premise of “one 
country, two systems.”  This system would allow Hong Kong to maintain its social system, economic 
autonomy and its status as a free port and world financial hub.  For the fifty year period the citizens of 
Hong Kong would also not pay taxes to the PRC, and English would remain the official language.  China’s 
strategy of incorporating Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region is also meant to entice Taiwan 
reunification.  Beijing hopes to incorporate Taiwan into the PRC as a Special Administrative Region.   
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China planned on inheriting the British system of appointing the chief executive of Hong Kong 
until British government decided to place a populist president, Chris Patten, to serve as the government 
instead of the traditional foreign office diplomat.  He introduced 1994 election reforms that Beijing 
accused of being designed to dismantle their effort to rule Hong Kong in 1997.  China would abolish the 
reforms because they believed it would encourage democracy on the mainland and influence separatists 
in Tibet, Xinjiang and Tibet.212  On July 1, 1997 Hong Kong officially changed hands.  Leading up to the 
hand-over a giant clock was resurrected in Tiananmen Square counting down the days, hours and 
minutes until China regained full sovereignty over Hong Kong for the first time in 155 years.  As of 2013 
most people of Hong Kong valued their free way of life and have increasingly accepted PRC rule.213  They 
are economically benefitting from China’s economic rise while enjoying their autonomy from the 
mainland.  Traditionally the people of Hong Kong have been apolitical and pragmatic on the pursuit of 
making money.  Hong Kong’s financial power also provides them with leverage Beijing. 
While the people of Hong Kong have traditionally been apolitical, lately there has been an 
escalating battle regarding the future of democracy on Hong Kong.  It seems the apolitical identify we 
have associated with Hong Kong, may be changing.  The island is currently scheduled to vote for their 
chief executive for the first time in 2017.  However, Beijing seems to be seeking to control who can 
actually run.  Over the past several months the people of Hong Kong have become more insistent of 
having full democratic elections in 2017.  On January 1, 2014 thousands protested for full democratic 
elections in 2017 so that even Beijing critics to run for office.214  It will be interesting to see how this 
battle plays out.  Beijing has the power to decide who runs for office, but it may not be in their best 
interests to do so.  Beijing knows that Taiwan will be watching how democracy plays in Hong Kong.  If 
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Beijing is determined to control the selection of candidates it may increase Taiwan’s fears of possibly 
unifying with the mainland. 
 Macao’s handover was much smoother than Hong Kong.  It too today operates as a Special 
Administrative Region .  In 1974 following a leftist military coup in Portugal the new Portuguese 
government decided to relinquish its colonial possessions.  However, Beijing was not ready to 
administer the territory and asked Lisbon to continue to administer it.  It was agreed that Macao was a 
Chinese territory under Portuguese administration and the handover of Macao would be settled 
through negotiations.  On April 13, 1987 both sides signed a joint declaration modeled after the Sino-
British settlement in 1985 that determined the fate of Hong Kong.  They agreed that China would 
assume sovereignty over Macao in 1999, negating the 1887 treaty by which the Qing ceded the territory 
to Portugal.  Today Macao operates as the gambling center of Asia, essentially an eastern version of Las 







The issue of Taiwan is extremely sensitive to Beijing, and Beijing’s policies towards Taiwan seem 
to make the world suspicious that China’s nationalistic rise will be aggressive.  The creation of Taiwan 
was also the result of Chinese nationalism, as it was founded by the KMT who for a long time held that 
they were the sole rulers of China.  Taiwan is currently legally administered as the Republic of China but 
is internationally recognized by only twenty-one UN member states and the Vatican.   The People’s 
Republic of China continues to maintain that Taiwan is the 23rd province of the PRC, while Taiwan does 
not explicitly state its legal status.  China also believes that Taiwan is historically China’s, much like 
Xinjiang and Tibet.  I aim to prove that China’s claim to Taiwan is also relatively recent and is the result 
of conquests under the expansionistic Qing Dynasty.  Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Taiwan is populated by a 
98% ethnic Han majority.  The people of Taiwan are searching for their own identity in response to 
Chinese nationalism, just as the Tibetans and Uyghurs are.  Although ethnically Han, Taiwan is a melting 
pot of identities that simultaneously drive the territory towards reunification with China and towards 
seeking its outright independence. 
 Taiwan was first settled by European colonists before the mainland Chinese.  The island was 
originally named “Formosa” (beautiful island) by Portuguese travelers in the early 1540s, and the Dutch 





would be the first Europeans to colonize the island in 1624.216  The first Europeans to land on the island 
would be a shipwrecked Portuguese crew in 1582. At this time the island was home to several thousand 
aboriginal tribes and was without influence from mainland China.  In fact the island of Taiwan was 
traditionally off the Chinese map entirely.217  The importance of this land to China is new, especially 
when quantifying the original unification of Chinese territory as the Qin conquest in 221 BC.  Chinese 
officials during the Ming Dynasty held such distaste for the island that they urged the Dutch to settle 
their colony on the island of Taiwan and not the smaller Penghu islands in the Taiwan Strait.218  The 
Chinese settlement of Taiwan would not begin until the Ming loyalist Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 
retreated to Taiwan in 1661.  In comparison, the British settlements at Jamestown and Plymouth 
predate the Chinese settlement on Taiwan.  Zheng Chenggong’s settlement of the island marked the 
beginning of ethnic Han political control over the island.  It would not be the last time a crumbling 
regime would retreat to Taiwan and launch attacks towards the rival regime on the mainland.  Chiang 
Kai-shek would do the same thing. 
 Zheng Chenggong the son of a Chinese pirate and his Japanese wife, was born in Japan but 
raised in Fujian, China.  He began attacking Taiwan in 1661 after abandoning his efforts to reestablish 
the Ming Dynasty.  He then launched an attack against the Dutch stronghold of Zeelandia (near 
contemporary Tainan), besieging forts with 30,000 men against 2,000 Dutch.219  By 1662 he held control 
over the island, ending the 38-year reign of Formosa being a Dutch colony.  It is often speculated that he 
retreated to Taiwan because his power base was across the strait in Fujian, but he may have been 
primarily drawn to Taiwan due to the Dutch economic presence there.220  Regardless, he did establish a 
short republic that aimed at fiercely fighting the Qing rule.  Zheng would die shortly after solidifying 
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control over the island in 1662.  However, he is tremendously important to Taiwanese history because 
he successfully integrated Taiwan into southeastern Chinese culture.  Most settlers came from the 
province of Fujian and spoke a dialect of Chinese known as Southern Minn.  Later ethnic Han who spoke 
the Hakka dialect from Guangdong would come and then in the 1940s more mainlanders fled to Taiwan 
during the Chinese Civil War.  Thus Zheng’s legacy is important because he is the reason of current 
ethnic Chinese political control on the island of Taiwan.221   
 In 1683 the Qing Dynasty would conquer Taiwan, marking the first time in the island’s history 
that it would be legally administered from a capital on the mainland.  Due to the Fujian connection it 
would be placed as a prefecture of Fujian province due to the Fujian connection, and officially enter the 
Chinese map.222  It was not proclaimed a province of China.  Taiwan would eventually become a province 
in 1887 with Taipei as the provincial capital.  However, in 1895 the island (along with the Pescadores) 
would be ceded in perpetuity to Japan with the Treaty of Shimonoseki.  Taiwan then shifted from a 
province of China to a Japanese colony, and a very successful Japanese colony at that.   Although there 
was originally minor resistance, including the ten-day long Republic of Taiwan, order was quickly 
established and Japan moved towards its goals of economically developing Taiwan for the benefit of 
Imperial Japan.223  During this period Taiwan would become more economically advanced than its 
mainland counterparts.  However, this economic improvement came with a cost as there was little 
respect for Taiwanese identity, leading many to look forward to a day of renewed unification with the 
homeland.  Japanese was inaugurated as the language of schools, not the standard Chinese or the Min 
dialect.  The social policies were progressive as Taiwan’s literacy rate, technological skills and world 
knowledge was improved to a superior degree compared to the mainland but these policies were 
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enacted with little understanding or care for Taiwanese customs and traditions.224  So although Japan 
brought order and development they may have affected the growth of a nationalistic sentiment 
amongst Taiwanese.225  This correlates with a rising nationalistic sentiment at the turn of the 20th 
century amongst Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Han Chinese. 
 After Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China.  It 
had been agreed at the 1943 Cairo Conference that China would receive this territory back from Japan.  
The period following the renewal of Chinese sovereignty to Taiwan was characterized by many emotions 
and mixed perceptions.  First, some KMT nationalists coming to the island regarded Taiwanese as 
traitors for having fought on different sides in the war.  A good portion of the Taiwanese had fought in 
China (including the Rape of Nanjing) and according to one source 207,183 Taiwanese were conscripted 
into military service and 30,304 of them were casualties in the war.226  Many Taiwanese eagerly awaited 
the reunion of Taiwan with the mainland and had dreamed of this day.  Many of them were 
disappointed when they realized how much more advanced they were than their cousins on the 
mainland.  For example the Taiwanese had become accustomed to using toilet paper to clean 
themselves after a bowel movement while those on the mainland were still using bamboo.  Joseph R. 
Allen summarizes this dichotomy perfectly: 
In policy and personality, the Chinese government regarded the Taiwanese, especially 
the Japanese-educated elite, with deep suspicion and distrust – as a people who has a 
‘slave mentality’ (nuhua jiaoyu).  The Taiwanese, on the other hand, came to see the 
new Chinese rulers, especially the army and police, as uncivilized boors and brutes.  
While the Nationalist forces expected to be seen as comrades who had suffered through 
a horrendous war on the continent against the Japanese, the Taiwanese elites expected 
to be treated as an educated class who had gained experience and insight into the 
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modern world during fifty years of Japanese rule.  These worldviews were on a collision 
course.227 
 Under the Japanese system of governance the populous was largely broken down into 
Taiwanese (or Islanders) and Japanese.  After the fall of the Japanese Empire, the Japanese population 
left Taiwan, which was 8% of the population.228  The arrival of the mainlanders in 1945 resulted in two 
separate identities: mainlanders and Taiwanese.  Both of these identities could be further broken down 
into the educated, cosmopolitan elite and the simple, uneducated rural types (including soldiers).229  The 
tension between mainlanders eventually broke out on February 28, 1947 and is known as the February 
28 (2-28) incident.  The violence began in reaction to a government officer unintentionally shooting a 
Taiwanese bystander during a protest.  The violence would continue for two weeks as the Taiwanese 
unleased a year and a half worth of frustration against the mainlanders.230  In response the KMT would 
unleash a harsh crackdown against the Taiwanese elite in which thousands were executed.  It is truly 
unknown how many were executed, but the official count is 6,300 and the popular perception hovers 
around 10,000.231  Others counted the number around 20,000.232  This began the decade’s long policy of 
“white terror” on the island that suppressed the slightest grain of protest amongst the island.  The 2-28 
incident would be eliminated from popular discourse until martial law was lifted in the 1980s.  Only 
since then have the people of Taiwan been able to discuss the 2-28 incident. 
 In 1949 the KMT would lose the Chinese Civil War and like Zheng Chenggong, retreat to Taiwan 
as a base of power to fight against the Communist regime.  The retreat to Taiwan was seen as 
temporary; it was not seen as a final destination nor a place for Chiang Kai-Shek to establish a republic 
for Chinese people.  In fact Chiang proclaimed the Republic of China to be the legitimate ruler of all of 
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China.  Remember, Taiwan was traditionally part of the Chinese homeland, but part of the frontier 
incorporated into China by the expansionist Qing Dynasty.  The PRC has never for even one day legally 
administered the territory of Taiwan.  Taiwan’s 390 years since the Dutch colonization in 1624 have 
been tumultuous and its international status confusing.  Of those 390 years, Taiwan has belonged to the 
Han Chinese or Manchu political structure for 302 of those 390 years (77.4%) along with periods of 
European and Japanese colonization (1624-1662, 1895-1945).  It however has only been administered 
by a political entity with its capital on mainland China for 216 (55.4%) of those years (1683-1895, 1945-
1949).  Furthermore it has only been administered as a province of mainland China for 12 (3%) of those 
years (1887-1895, 1945-1949).  Finally it has been legally administered by the PRC for zero of these 
years.  The PRC believes Taiwan is theirs because they succeeded the Republic of China as the legitimate 
ruler of mainland China.   
 Mao Zedong and the PLA were preparing for a tremendous invasion of Taiwan before the 
Korean War prevented these plans.  At the time, there was no indication that President Truman would 
intervene to prevent the PRC from consolidating its rule over Taiwan.  The PLA knew this invasion would 
be difficult after their failed capture of Jinmen Island (one of the islands of the ROC off the coast of 
Fujian and geographically closer to PRC than Taiwan) in October of 1949, and Chiang Kai-shek’s 1 million 
KMT troops that retreated to Taiwan.233  Because Chiang also took much of the Chinese navy and large 
merchant marine ships, Mao’s planned invasion required the use of thousands of small boats and to 
drop soldiers a mile off shore and swim to Taiwan’s banks.234  Thus Mao trained his army to swim.  The 
invasion would be further delayed after many PLA troops became ill.  After the capture of Hainan Island 
in April of 1950, Mao was ready to move on to the final stages of territorial consolidation: Tibet and 
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Taiwan.235  The territory of Outer Mongolia (contemporary Mongolia) would have been included as well 
had it not been for Stalin and the Soviet Union who secured an independent Mongolian People’s 
Republic.  The invasion of Taiwan was set to be undertaken by the PLA Third Army out of Fujian and 
Zhejiang, and their commanding general was well aware of how difficult this undertaking would be as 
witnessed by his assessment in February 1950: 
I must first of all point out that the liberation of the islands along the southern coast, 
especially Taiwan, is an extremely big problem and will involve the biggest campaign in 
the history of modern Chinese warfare… [Taiwan] cannot be occupied without sufficient 
transport, suitable equipment, and adequate supplies.  Furthermore a considerable 
number of Chiang Kai-shek’s land, sea, and air forces are concentrated there together 
with a batch of the most intransigent reactionaries who have fled from China’s 
mainland.  They have built strong defense works, depending on the surrounding sea for 
protection. 
 The CCP and the PLA did not want to rush the invasion, nor were they willing to allow Chiang to 
continue the existence of the Republic of China claiming to be the rightful ruler of the mainland.  The 
only reason Taiwan was not brought under communist control was because of the US decision to deter 
the aggression of North Korea.  As mentioned earlier, President Truman ordered the 7th Fleet to 
“neutralize” the Taiwan Strait to prevent Mao from seizing the global attention on North Korea to attack 
Taiwan.  Perhaps his assessment was correct because the PLA would invade Tibet, the other territory it 
needed to consolidate.  Instead many of the troops positioned for the future invasion of Taiwan would 
be transported north for eventual insertion into the Korean War.  30,000 troops from the Third Army 
were moved to the area of Mukden area, near the Yalu River.236  It is important to note that Mao did not 
lend his support to the North Korean invasion because he thought the risk of American intervention was 
too high and that it should wait until after China completed its Civil War with Taiwan.237  He did not think 
America would allow communism to expand into both places. 
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 The American actions during the Korean War helped further Taiwan’s identity from the 
mainland by preventing it from unifying with the PRC.  This would result in the 1954 US-ROC Mutual 
Defense Treaty and American policy of intervention during the three Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-1955, 
1958 and 1995-1996.  Without the American defense commitment Taiwan likely would have been 
integrated into the PRC.   The first two Taiwan Strait Crises of 1954-1955 and 1958 were not actual 
attempts by Beijing to take Taiwan, but rather to signal that Beijing was committed to maintaining its 
sovereignty claim to the island.238  The third Taiwan Strait Crises resulted from Beijing’s reaction to what 
seemed to be the growing sentiment of Taiwanese independence/separatism.  These American actions 
would secure Taiwan’s fate and identity as being different from the mainland.  It would also pave the 
way for democratization, which is truly an aspect of Taiwan’s identity distinctly different from the 
People’s Republic of China.   
 The seeds for the First Taiwan Strait Crises were sown when President Eisenhower ordered the 
removal of the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait on February 2, 1953.  Chiang Kai-shek decided to 
seize the opportunity to move KMT soldiers to the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.  Both islands 
are just off the shore of the Chinese mainland, and over a hundred miles from the island of Taiwan.  
Depending upon viewpoints the islands were Taiwan’s first line of defense, or as Nationalist propaganda 
depicted it, the forward operating base for the reconquest of the mainland.239  These islands would 
become the foreground for both the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises.  Mao would begin shelling 
the islands in August 1954, and it became a crisis of global significance.  However, Mao did not want to 
incorporate these islands into the PRC because taking them would have severed the Republic of China’s 
ties to the mainland.  By instigating a crisis, and causing a political response, Mao was able to keep its 
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claim to “One China,” and by not taking the islands he prevented a future of two separate China’s.  Mao 
told Khrushchev:  
All we wanted to do was show our potential.  We don’t want Chiang to be far away from 
us.  We want to keep him within our reach.  Having him [on Quemoy and Matsu] means 
we can get at him with our shore batteries as well as our air force.  If we’d occupied the 
islands we would have lost the ability to cause him discomfort any time we want.240  
The crisis would end after the United States threatened nuclear war with China if they didn’t 
back down.  This has led some to claim that the real motive behind Mao’s shelling was to create a 
situation with such a tremendous risk for nuclear war that Moscow would help assist a Chinese nuclear 
weapons program for the purpose of easing the burden of Soviet assistance to Beijing.241 
 The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 would also involve Mao shelling the offshore islands.  
After this, Khrushchev would cancel the Nuclear weapons deal.  Mao began the shelling without 
informing Khrushchev, and Moscow waited until the Taiwan Strait Crises was over to cancel the nuclear 
deal.242  The shelling began on August 23, 1958 and would last until early October.  Again, this was 
largely political and was not meant to agitate a war with the Republic of China.  Much like the first 
Taiwan Crisis it tested the US commitment to defending Taiwan, increased the international agenda for 
China, and kept Chiang Kai-shek committed to the islands near China’s coast.  Again Mao brought the 
USSR and the US to the threats of nuclear war over small islands with no real significance.  Unlike the 
first crisis, the aim was also to use an international crisis to strengthen support at home for the Great 
Leap Forward. 243  During this time US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles recommended that Chiang 
relinquish his sovereignty over the offshore islands in an effort to completely separate the island from 
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the mainland, but he did not.  It is important to remember that Chiang still had visions of reuniting 
Taiwan with the mainland under his Republic, not the Communist party.   
 Kissinger’s trip to China in 1971 paved the way for improved US-PRC relations, and led to the 
change of international recognition towards the PRC as the legitimate ruler of mainland China.  That 
year the PRC would replace the ROC as China’s international representative at the UN.  This of course 
included the coveted seat as a permanent member on the UN Security Council.  The shift in recognition 
left KMT rulers on Taiwan practically realizing that their goal of reunifying China under their rule was 
over.  Chiang Kai-shek’s death in April 1975 symbolized the final end of Nationalist hope to unify the 
country.244  His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, helped lead and engineer the party leadership and would 
successfully transition Taiwan from an authoritarian state to a democratic society.  On January 1, 1979 
Taiwan’s international status was further isolated when the United States severed official diplomatic ties 
with Taiwan for the PRC.  This coincided with the acknowledgment of the mainland’s One China Policy, 
the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the removal of US military personal from the island 
within four months.  However, the US would show its commitment to Taiwan that April when the US 
Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act.  This act would show the US commitment to defending 
Taiwan, which included the island of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) Islands just off the coast of 
Taiwan.  It included no mention to the other offshore islands.  However, contrary to conventional belief, 
the act does not legally bind the US to defending Taiwan.  
 During Chiang Kai-shek’s reign, Taiwan began to formulate its own identity from the mainland.  
While mainland China was raved by Mao’s Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, Taiwan 
began its economic miracle.  During the mid-1960s Taiwan, along with Singapore, Hong Kong and South 
Korea would be labeled one of the four Asian Tigers that were experiencing “economic miracles.”  
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Taiwan’s economic success could be contributed to the actions of four different governments, all to 
varying degrees: Japan’s leadership from 1895-1945 as a Japanese colony, the US aid to Taiwan from 
1951-1965, the PRC’s failure to incorporate Taiwan into the mainland, and the political 
stability/monopoly of power by the KMT.  As mentioned earlier the Japanese colonial period advanced 
Taiwan’s economy and quality of life past that of the mainland.  This was especially prevalent in 
education where the amount of children in school grew from 66,000 in 1914 to 798,000 in 1944 while 
the population only grew from four to six million.  Three-fourths of children were in school in 1944, and 
by 1949 nearly half the population was literate.245  During the period of Japanese occupation Taiwan’s 
economy surpassed all of East Asia, with the exception of Japan.246  Taiwan was also fortunate to be 
exposed to modern railroads, telephones, banking and legal systems that protected individual rights and 
private property.247  However, the relationship between Japan and Taiwan was still exploitative as 
Taiwan was to serve the interest of the mother country, Japan.  Taiwan would export far more to Japan 
than it would import248 and traded mostly with Japan or the Japanese colony of Manchukuo.  World War 
II would also spur Taiwanese industrialization to aid Japan’s war effort, and Taiwan was fortunate that 
the US bombs largely avoided economic infrastructure on the island.249 
 The 1945 transition of Japanese to Nationalists power did not go smoothly for the Taiwanese 
economy.  KMT policies, or the lack of them, would severely damage Taiwan’s economy, along with the 
influx of 1.5 million Chinese from the mainland and the defense spending efforts to prevent a PRC 
invasion.250  US Security ties and economic aid after the Korean War would allow Taiwan to reallocate 
resources towards economic development.  To make the economy self-sufficient, Taiwan would also 
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follow an import substitution policy, which further led them to industrialize and export.  The United 
States supported the drive towards industrialization and focus on exports if the KMT would focus on 
domestic economic development and not retaking the mainland.251  In 1960 Taiwan officials would agree 
and they launched a Nineteen Point Program for Economic and Financial Reform and by 1965 the US 
would cease its funding of new aid programs.252   By this time Taiwan’s economy would appear strong 
again though the primary factors in this would be US foreign aid (1951-1965), the threat of PRC force, 
and KMT political stability.  Those three factors seem to have laid the foundations for Taiwan’s export 
dependent economic miracle.  By the time martial law was lifted in 1987 Taiwan’s economy was the 
most trade-dependent in the world, with the exceptions of the city-states of Hong Kong and 
Singapore.253  
 Taiwan’s economic progress and liberalization did not directly coincide with political reforms 
and liberalization.  While economic liberalization categorically occurred in the 1960s, Taiwan’s 
democratization began in the 1980s.  It, however, would be a mistake to correlate Taiwan’s 
democratization as meaning the same thing as independence.  Some who advocated for outright 
independence from the PRC were against democratization, and some strong advocates for 
democratization were pro-unification.254  Furthermore Taiwan consciousness is not always synonymous 
with calls for independence.255  Regardless, the political system in the ROC does make the island of 
Taiwan distinctly different from the mainland.  The ROC holds local and national elections, and contains 
a five-branch system of government that features a combination of the US-system and traditional 
Chinese imperial system.  It is essentially a west + 2 model where the traditional branches of executive, 
legislative and judicial branches exist, along with the Control Yuan (branch) and Examinations Yuan 
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(branch).  The Control Yuan is a borderline judicial branch that is designed to act as an oversight on 
officials, and the Examination Yuan is responsible for administering the traditional civil service exams.256  
It, however, would be a mistake to confuse the different political identity to mean Taiwan is different 
culturally from the mainland. 
 Elections began locally in 1950, but would not occur on the national level until 1980.  National 
elections were not held under Chiang Kai-shek because the ROC claimed jurisdiction over the entire 
mainland and could not hold elections on the mainland.  In addition Dr. Sun Yat-sen called for a gradual 
transition to democracy through economic development.   There existed a fear that democratizing too 
quickly would ignite political instability.257  Cynics will claim the lack of democracy had more to do with 
KMT and Chiang Kai-shek trying to keep its grip on power.  Until democratization, the ROC effectively 
ruled as a one-party state.  After Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975, his song Chiang Ching-kuo would lead the 
KMT.  He had ruled as Premier since 1972, and would take over as President in 1978 after Yen Chia-kan 
resigned.  As President, Chiang Ching-Kuo would lead the transition towards democracy.  Chiang Ching-
Kuo was completely opposed to independence, saw the mainland as his home, yet was the first to 
recognize and promote Taiwanization (promotion of Taiwanese cadres within KMT).258  He would act as 
the bridge between his father’s authoritarian rule that preceded him, and the democratization that 
followed him.259  This period is effectively known as “soft authoritarianism.”  
 Chiang Ching-kuo had scheduled the first elections to take place in December 1978, but they 
were cancelled abruptly following President Carter’s announcement that the US and the ROC would 
cease its diplomatic elections.  As a result the election would be rescheduled for 1980.  Under Chiang 
Ching-kuo’s leadership agreements were reached with the tang wai opposition candidates to ensure a 
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genuinely competitive race for parliamentary seats.260  The tang wai was not a party but a loose 
conglomerate of politicians bonded together in opposition to the KMT’s role in the political system and 
dissatisfaction with Taiwan’s place in the international arena.261  The KMT would dominate the early 
elections of 1980, 1981, 1983, and 1985 gathering roughly 70% of the vote and increasing party leaders 
confidence.262   In 1986 the tang wai politicians would be organized into the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), and the 1986 election would feature the first two-party election on Chinese soil.  It was 
mainly a Taiwanese party (as opposed to the mainlander KMT party), and native Han-Taiwanese 
constituted roughly 85% of the island at this time.  At this point the DDP was unsure its policy on the 
issue of independence/reunification, as few Taiwanese favored reunification but the moderates seemed 
to see no reason to challenge the KMT one-China policy while the radicals wished for some sort of 
Taiwan independence.263  The KMT would win the election easily and the following year resulted in the 
lifting of martial law that had been in place since 1949 which some called “neocolonial.”264 
 In 1988 Chiang Ching-kuo would die with Lee Teng-hui taking over party leadership.  Chiang 
Ching-kuo had groomed Lee to be his successor.  Lee Teng-hui was of Hakka descent and would be the 
first native born leader of Taiwan.  He was Taiwanese, not a mainlander, leading what was known to be 
a mainlander party.  He would become a tremendous promoter of Taiwanese identity, democratization 
and in Beijing’s eyes the epitome of “separatism.”  He was determined to increase Taiwan’s image in the 
international arena and increase ties to nations that did not recognize official diplomatic recognition of 
the ROC.  As of November 2013 the ROC is only officially recognized by 22 countries (mostly small ones), 
although it maintains 92 representative offices in the major cities in 57 countries, and other countries 
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keep over 65 representative offices on the island of Taiwan.265  His commitment to increasing Taiwan’s 
international image was witnessed in his first press conference on February 22, 1988 where he 
explained that Beijing’s “One Country, Two Systems” is not acceptable because it would reduce Taiwan 
to the role of a local government.266  Lee also faced a great deal of adversity in solidifying his own 
personal power base and earning the respect of the mainlander elders within the KMT.   
In the 1989 election the DDP’s performance would be labeled a “victory” and a “breakthrough” 
as they gained more seats since the 1986 election.  They would not fare well in the 1991 non 
supplemental National Assembly Election due to the poor choice of making Taiwan’s independence a 
main issue.267  This was a special election after many elder members resigned, as National Assembly 
membership had been intact since 1947 because the ROC refused to hold elections for the Assembly 
representing all of mainland China which was undergoing a “communist revolution.”  It slowly lost its 
power throughout the process of democratization in the 1980s as its powers gradually went to the 
Legislative Yuan and finally be defunct in 2005. In 1992 Taiwan would hold an election for all 161 new 
members to form the Second Legislative Yuan (the first having lasted from 1947-1991) in which the DDP 
would improve from the year before and capture 31.3% of the popular vote while the KMT received only 
53.2% of the vote.268  This reflected the common desire for younger, cleaner, and fresher 
representatives as several incumbent KMT candidates lost their bids, and most importantly the 
continuation of political reforms.269 
While many may be against reunification, many are also opposed to outright independence due 
to the security threat from the PRC.  As evidence of the elections, it is unclear what direction Taiwan will 
ultimately go and it is unclear what most want.  The threat from the PRC most certainly plays a role, as 
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many voters see no reason to advocate for independence and antagonize Beijing.  For example, in 1995 
the New Party (pro-unification party formed in 1993 by members of the KMT who believed the DDP was 
too separatist and championed independence too much, and Lee Teng-hui’s KMT did not support the 
reunification of China) tripled their seats (12.5% of popular vote) in the Legislative Yuan election 
because of Beijing’s intimidation performing missile tests leading up to the election.270  The New Party 
was not wrong in their assessment of Lee Teng-hui’s LMT leadership he did desire to establish Taiwan as 
a sovereign state even though he pledged his support for reunification to gather mainlander support.271  
In 1996 the ROC would hold its first direct election of the president and vice president, and incumbent 
Lee Teng-hui, along with his running mate, Lien Chan, would emerge victorious with 54% of the popular 
vote over the DDP and independent party leaders.  This event was historic, and a defining moment in 
Taiwan’s democratization as the election marked the first time a Chinese leader was democratically 
elected.  It was also conducted during the Third Taiwan Strait Crises.  
Taiwan’s second presidential election in 2000 was even more historic.  DDP candidate Chen 
Shui-bian beat independent candidate Song Chu-yu (formerly KMT, ran independently after Lee Teng-
hui did not nominate him), and KMT candidate Lien Chan.  It ended the period of KMT rule on Taiwan, 
and is generally acknowledged as the completion of democratization on Taiwan.  Much like the 1996 
election, it was closely watched by Beijing.  Beijing was concerned that the trend of democratization 
correlated with a growing independence sentiment from the PRC.  Beijing was especially concerned with 
what appeared to be increasing support for the DDP’s Chen Shui-ben.272  Three days before the election 
Premier Zhu Rongyi warned that China would use blood to protect its territory in Taiwan.  It seemed that 
voters were not intimidated by the Zhu’s warning, much like how in 1996 the missile tests did not 
detract voters from voting for Lee Teng-hui.  Chen Shui-ban would again defeat Lien Chan in the 2004 
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election by a narrow margin (50.1% to 49.9%) keeping power in the DDP’s hands before it transferred 
again in 2008 after KMT candidate Ma Ying-jeou defeated DDP’s Frank Hsieh (58.5% to 41.5%).273  It was 
of little surprise Ma Ying-jeou won with his promise to ease tensions with Beijing and repair the 
relationship with Washington.274  In 2012, the most recent presidential election, Ma Ying-jeou would be 
reelected by popular vote.   
The waves of voting on Taiwan makes people wonder: what do the people of Taiwan really 
want?  Do they want unification with China or independence?  There is truthfully no concrete answer to 
this but for now the majority favors maintaining the status quo.  The mainlanders on Taiwan who 
support reunification, do not want it in the immediate future.275  When the people on Taiwan were 
asked in polls dating from 1996-2008 about immediate unification 1-5% of respondents said yes, while 
3-14% said they wanted independence no matter what. 276  The majority favored postponing settlement 
through “status quo now, decision later,” “status quo indefinitely,” “status quo now, independence 
later,” and “status quo now, unification later.277  It seems that the people of Taiwan are afraid of being 
integrated into China and losing their way of life: their style of governance, their lifestyle and their 
higher standard of living.  If these fears are eased the reaction against unification will dwindle.  The 
status quo sentiments are also an expression of the desire to avoid armed conflict, which is only 
apparent because of Beijing’s claim to maintain Taiwan at all costs.  So as much as voters may desire 
independence in the hypothetical sense, the current reality is that Beijing will not let that occur.  It is 
commonly believed that the CCP will fall if they let Taiwan become independent without a fight, and the 
people of the PRC care deeply about the Taiwan issue because they have been influence to care by the 
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state media and education.278  Most importantly, no Chinese leader can survive “losing Taiwan.”  A 
leader who unites Taiwan will be honored by history, while one who loses Taiwan will be vilified.   
Other important question to consider is whether Taiwan is a part of the Chinese nation, and 
whether the Taiwanese identity is distinctly different from being Chinese.  Again, these questions do not 
have clear-cut answers and are open to interpretation.  Taiwan is certainly distinctly different from 
Xinjiang and Tibet because the Taiwanese are of the Han ethnicity.  The languages spoken on Taiwan are 
also all based on the written Chinese language, unlike the Tibetans or Uyghurs.  However, the sense of 
belonging to the Chinese nation is weaker in Taiwan than in Hong Kong.279  The resistance against being 
part of the Chinese nation is most certainly also a response against the mainlander elite that controlled 
the Republic of China, the threat from the PRC, and the feeling that mainland China is backward in 
comparison to Taiwan.  Public opinion polls in 1989 and 2008 indicated that the number of respondents 
who “thought of themselves as Chinese,” declined from 54% to 4.2%, the respondents who “thought of 
themselves as Taiwanese” rose from 18% to 50.8%, and those who thought of themselves as “both” rose 
from 28% to 40.8%.280  In addition the Taiwanese identity is complicated because it can be used to 
describe the ethnic Han who reside in Taiwan or it can be used as a distinction against the mainlander 
population who came over since 1945.  In 1998 the KMT (traditionally a mainlander party) ran on the 
campaign theme of the “new Taiwanese,” and Ma Ying-jeou (the current President of the ROC) became 
the mayor of Taipei on this slogan.281  He himself was born and raised on Taiwan but his father was a 
mainlander who came over after 1949. Today the Han ethnicity populates roughly 98% of the land, with 
original aboriginal tribes making up the other 2%.  However, the Han ethnicity is traditionally broken 
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down into sub-ethnic groups of Taiwanese (84%) and mainlander (14%).282  Mandarin is still the official 
language but the Min (Taiwanese) and Hakka dialects are commonly spoken, with Min sometimes being 
used an expression of Taiwanese identity.  Originally DDP politicians campaigned using Min rather than 
Mandarin to depict itself as a non-mainlander party. 
No one should believe that the PRC will give up its claim to Taiwan or renounce the right to use 
force to enforce their claim.  As long as the CCP is in power this will be the case.  Beijing hopes to entice 
Taiwan into integrating into the PRC under the formula of “one country, two systems,” that has been 
outlined in Hong Kong.  As far back as 1982 under Deng Xiaoping, China has hoped that the Hong Kong 
Model would entice the Republic of China towards reunification.  However, during the 1990s Taiwan 
moved further away from Beijing under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui.  He thought that unification 
under Beijing’s terms would reduce Taiwan to local significance and advocated for a “two state theory” 
which consisted of Taipei and Beijing having “a special state-to-state relationship.”  His advancement of 
Taiwan towards becoming an independent sovereign state further agitated Beijing.  It was during his 
presidency in the aftermath of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis (1995-1996) and the US response that 
Beijing realized it needed to strengthen its military if it wanted to truly have a military option to solve 
the Taiwan issue.  Since then China has poured much money into its military spending, especially the 
Navy, and the Taiwan issue has been at the forefront of this policy.  As a result it is fair to assume that 
Lee Teng-hui’s legacy will be determined by the fate of Taiwan: if Taiwan becomes an independent 
nation he will be applauded as a hero, but if Taiwan is reunited by force history will not be kind to him 
because his policies will have helped bring suffering to the people of Taiwan.283 
Until the Taiwan problem is resolved, the PLA considers Taiwan its primary war-fighting scenario 
and preparation for this task has “absorbed the lion’s share of the military modernization effort since 
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the mid-1990s.”284  According to SIRI Chinese defense spending rose from $30 billion in 2000 to almost 
$120 billion in 2010 but there is no clear consensus on the exact figure due to the PRC’s opaqueness.285  
As a result since 2000 Beijing’s military strength vis-à-vis Taipei and Washington have been increasing.   
Beijing’s forces seem to be stronger than Taiwan’s but have yet to catch-up to that of the United States.  
The PLA’s planning includes strategies to enforce its claim on Taiwan even with a US intervention.  
Although the United States policy is one of “strategic ambiguity,” it is largely believed that the US would 
aid Taiwan.  In order to prevent an American intervention, China has been investing in “anti-access/area 
denial” (A2AD) weapons to prevent, deter, or delay American intervention.  These are asymmetric 
capabilities that include “thousands of accurate land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, modern jets with 
anti-ship missiles, a fleet of submarines (both conventionally and nuclear-powered), long-range radars 
and surveillance satellites, and cyber and space weapons intended to ‘blind’ American forces.”286  In the 
event of a Taiwan crisis, China desires to keep the United States Navy outside the First Island Chain.  In 
that sense the Taiwan issue is interlinked with China’s fight for control over the South and East China 
Seas because their strategic possession of these sea lanes helps in their effort to consolidate Taiwan.  
Also, China is worried about a US Naval blockade in the event of another Taiwan crisis.   
There is speculation on what exactly China’s course of action would be in militarily handling the 
Taiwan issue.  According to the Annual Report to Congress,  
It is possible China would first pursue a measured approach characterized by signaling 
its readiness to use force, followed by a deliberate buildup of force to optimize the 
speed of engagement over strategic deception.  Another option is that China would 
sacrifice overt, large scale preparations in favor of surprise to force rapid military and/or 
political resolution before other countries could respond.  If a quick resolution is not 
possible, China would seek to: deter potential U.S. interventions; failing that delay 
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intervention and seek victory in an asymmetric, limited, quick war; and, fight to a 
standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict.287 
Those findings coincide with the PRC’s previous uses of force throughout its history: It has constantly 
signaled its readiness to use force throughout the three Taiwan Strait Crises; it used surprise force to 
force a rapid political resolution during its border wars with India, the USSR and Vietnam; and it has 
engaged in long protracted conflicts as witnessed in the Chinese Civil War and the Korean War.  It is my 
belief that China will signal its readiness to use force if they want to create noise or signal their 
commitment to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue as seen in the three Taiwan Strait Crises.  If China 
decides that war is certain, it is likely they will use the principle of offensive deterrence to strike quickly 
to gain an edge in hope of reaching a quick political settlement.  If China deems US intervention likely, 
and is confidant in their own strength it would also be reasonable that they would use their A2AD 
weapons to strike first.  If a settlement can’t be reached quickly in Beijing’s favor they will fight a long 
protracted campaign to ensure it does because this is a civil war. 
 The status of Taiwan will be determined over the next several decades.  Beijing will continue its 
policy of building up its military might to strengthen their claim, yet hope they can resolve the issue 
peacefully.  They also have not slowed down their modernization despite the relaxing of cross-strait 
tensions since 2008 and Taiwan remains the primary military focus.288  In 2005 Beijing passed the Anti-
Succession Law which is directly aimed at illustrating Beijing’s commitment to unification.  Article 8 of 
the law states,  
In the event that the ‘Taiwanese independence’ secessionist forces should act under any 
name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s succession from China or that major 
incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur or that possibilities for a 
peaceful unification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ 
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nonpeaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. 
Beijing is 100% committed to this law and the idea of reunification.  Hopefully the future of Taiwan can 
be resolved peacefully in a manner that preserves Taiwanese identity within the Chinese nation, or 
Beijing reverses its policy and allows an independent Taiwan. 
 There are several plausible scenarios for the future of Taiwan with respect of China’s attempt to 
consolidate it, and reunify Taiwan with the mainland.  First and most preferable would be a peaceful 
unification through a negotiation process.  This would likely allow Taiwanese to keep their democratic 
institutions that they enjoy.  Second would be unification by force.  This would likely leave lasting scars 
on the Taiwanese people that ignite future separatist and antagonistic behavior against Beijing.  The 
worst-case scenario would be for the mainland to attempt to consolidate its authority over Taiwan by 
force, only to be defeated by America’s superior technology and military.  As one American think-tanker 
told Lee Kwan Yew that would not be the end of the Taiwan issue but rather “the beginning of the 
story.”289  It would not be difficult to imagine 1.3 billion Chinese being frustrated after being defeated by 
superior technology and united by the urge to show Americans they are not cowards or inferior.290  
Considering that the PLA military modernization was ignited by the need for a military option after the 
1995-1995 Taiwan Strait Crises and after watching how easily the American military defeated Iraq in the 
first Gulf War with superior technology, it is reasonable to suspect such a result.  A failure to reunify 
Taiwan with the mainland would also create domestic instability, considering the CCP has made Taiwan 
reunification part of its ideology and legitimacy. 
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South and East China Seas:  
291 
China’s territorial claims in the South (Spratly and Paracel Islands) and East China Sea (Senkaku 
Islands) are the source of tremendous regional tension.  China claim to the Spratly islands is disputed by 
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam who also claim the archipelago.  The Paracel 
Islands are also claimed by Taiwan and Vietnam.  In the East China Sea China is locked in a territorial 
dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Chinese) with Japan, but Taiwan also claims the islands.  At stake 
for China is fishing fights, control over shipping lanes, and a vast potential for resource extraction from 
the Sea.  In February 1992 Beijing passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone which 
states:  
The land territory of the PRC includes the mainland of the PRC and its coastal islands, 
Taiwan and all islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyutai [Senkaku] Islands, 
the Penghu Islands, the Dongsha Islands, Xisha [Paracel] Islands, Zhongsha Islands and 
the Nansha [Spratly] Islands as well as other islands belonging to the PRC.292 
 Beijing often cites this law as evidence to support its claim to the offshore islands.  Historically 
China’s believes that the South China Sea is China’s “southern sea,” hence it received the name nan hai 
(south sea) in Chinese.  Beijing operates from the perception that the South China Sea has always been 
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an internal lake of China.  It claims the sea has been China’s since the Han Dynasty in the second century 
A.D.293  Today Chinese maps and newspaper regularly print maps that show the maritime borders 
extending across the entire South China Sea to the Indonesia Island of Borneo.294  The “nine-dotted line 
map,” originally published by the Nationalist government in 1947 and republished by Beijing in 1992, 
shows the Chinese claims in an arc of nine long dashes around the entire South China Sea.295  These 
claims worry China’s southeastern neighbors who also make claims to islands in the sea.  The conflicting 
claims combined with the fast expansion of the Chinese navy, makes the South China Sea a constant 
source of tension in Asia. 
 China’s 1992 law was not the first time China claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea.  
Beijing has believed the sea and its islands to be China’s since the creation of the PRC.  China has never 
compromised its sovereignty over an offshore island with the exception of White Dragon Tail Island in 
1957 to North Vietnam.296  The island lies in the middle of the Tonkin Gulf.  Very little is known about 
this settlement, but it is believed Mao Zedong transferred the island to North Vietnam to aid its 
ideologically ally against their mutual enemy, the United States.297  However this was before the region 
realized the potential economic benefits owning the islands possessed.  Ownership of islands and its 
surrounding sea presents states with control of important shipping lanes and the opportunity to exploit 
the potential oil and gas resources that lay under the sea.  The islands at stake are the Spratly and 
Paracel Islands.  Thus Admiral Liu Huaqing the former People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and 
founder of the modern Chinese navy famously claimed “whoever controls the Spratlys will reap huge 
economic and military benefits.”298  
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 China’s memory of the “century of humiliation” haunts its perception whenever dealing with 
territorial disputes.  This period from the beginning of the First Opium War to the creation of the 
People’s Republic of China was marked by decay as foreign powers slowly dwindled away at Chinese 
territory.  England, France, Portugal, Germany, Russia and Japan all gained control of Chinese territories 
through war, negotiations and concessions.   The unequal treaties that consolidated these territorial 
gains are haunt China when its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands are questioned.   This could best 
be described by Shee Poon Kim’s statement that  
In assessing China’s conception of the sea and its strategic thinking towards the South 
China Sea, it is important to note that many leading Chinese analysts perceive China as a 
victim of sovereignty disputes over the Spratly Islands.  From China’s perspective, there 
is no issue over sovereignty in the Spratlys as these islands belong to China.  As such, the 
disputing states have ‘robbed’ China of its precious hydrocarbon resources, besides fish 
and other seafood resources in the South China Sea.299   
China is determined to not ignore even minor violations of its territorial integrity because this 
could be a slippery slope towards encroachment on Chinese territorial integrity.300  Thus since its 
founding the PRC’s main priority has been to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 To protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity China has labeled several areas a “core 
interest.”  In March 2010 High-ranking Chinese officials labeled the South China Sea as a “core interest” 
during a private meeting with US diplomats, and Hilary Clinton re-affirmed this claim after a May 2010 
meeting.301  Although Beijing has refrained from using these words in a public setting, they are 
important in understanding the importance China places on protecting its maritime claims in the South 
China Sea.  According to Toshi Yoshiha, an associate professor of strategy at the US Naval War College, 
“declaring such an interest would seemingly elevate the strategic importance of that body of water to a 
level reserved for Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang –territory that is integral to China’s vision of itself as a 
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nation and that must be protected at all costs.”302  However, no foreign country claims Taiwan, Tibet and 
Xinjiang (with the possible exception of Taiwan claiming itself as an independent country) as their 
territory; which makes the South China Sea claim extremely controversial with dangerous implications.  
If China truly believes that its territorial claims in the South China Sea must be protected at all costs, 
then China will be willing to fight Southeast Asian countries who also claim those islands.  A “core 
interest” position leaves no room for compromise over the sovereignty of the South China Sea.   
 China has consolidated its islands claims by force in the past.  In 1974 the PLAN clashed with 
South Vietnamese forces seizing the Crescent Group in the western sector of the Paracels; in 1988 PLAN 
forces fought the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’s Naval Forces at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands then 
went on to claim six other reefs claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines; and in 1994 China occupied 
Mischief Reef in the Spratlys without conflict which is also claimed by the Philippines.  Conflicts over 
offshore islands only began in the 1970s directly coincided with the growing of importance of possessing 
these islands.  The race for maritime resources began following a 1969 seismological survey in the East 
China Sea determined that precious resources laid along the Senkaku Islands.303  This increased the 
economic interest to securing maritime rights to the islands.  Today the economic benefits include the 
potential for vast resource extraction and fishing rights, especially if China can use these islands to claim 
an Exclusive Economic Zone up to 200 nm under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  This is 
especially interested because the CCP’s legitimacy is based upon economic improvement.   
 The 1974 clash with South Vietnam was preluded by intense competition between South 
Vietnam and China over the Spratlys and Paracels due to the growing importance of controlling these 
islands.  The two countries navies clashed on the morning of January 19, 1974, and China took 
advantage of the clash to seize the Western sector of the Paracels.  Before the clash, on January 11, 
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China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement challenging the South Vietnamese assertion over their 
administration of the Spratlys.  According to Taylor Fravel, China ordered a patrol to the Crescent Group 
on January 16 with the idea of convincing Vietnam to accept a status quo of China controlling the islands 
and if possible convince South Vietnam to abandon its position on Pattle Island.304  They were instructed 
to only fire if fired upon, and engage Vietnam in a “struggle of persuasion” to accept China as the 
sovereign rule.305  The naval patrol prompted a naval build-up by both sides that culminated in a clash 
on the 19th.  After the clash the Politburo ordered PLAN forces to seize the entire Crescent group from 
Vietnam and take advantage of the moment. 306  
 On March 14, 1988, China would engage with Vietnam on Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands.  
The conditions of the conflict were staged by China’s assertive decision in 1987 to occupy Fiery Cross.  
This was done in order to make a physical presence in the disputed Spratlys.307  Vietnam’s response to 
China’s occupation was to occupy the five reefs surrounding Fiery Cross in late January and early 
February of 1988.  This led to a series of three confrontations on January 31, February 18 and March 14, 
with the final conflict being deadly resulting in the deaths of seventy-four Vietnamese sailors.308  
According to Taylor Fravel, just like in 1974 China again did not set out with the plan of attacking 
Vietnamese ships.309  They intended to seize Fiery Reef, which was unoccupied, to consolidate their 
territorial claims.  This assertive decision created the conditions for the clash, as China challenged the 
status quo in the region.  Just like in 1974 China sought to politically alter the regional status-quo and 
enhance their territorial strength to the islands and the end result was a minor armed conflict with the 
country challenged by China’s claim.  This is important to understand the potential for future island 
conflicts to occur.  China’s move into the Spratlys prompted Vietnam to contain China’s presence, 
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increasing the odds for conflict and leading to the unplanned naval battle.  However, it is important to 
note that unlike 1974, China did not feel seize the opportunity and attack other Vietnamese occupied 
islands in the Spratlys.310   
China’s entrance into the Spratlys was also influenced by the PLAN’s own bureaucratic interests.  
They wanted to capitalize on the growing importance Deng Xiaoping placed upon the South China Sea as 
he shifted his goals from geo-strategic to geo-strategic and geo-economic.311  With this shift the PLAN 
began to argue how its mission directly coincided with the plan for economic modernization, as these 
missions provided a rationale for budgetary increases.312  Not only did controlling the sea yield economic 
benefits for resource extraction and fishing rights, in 1979 Deng Xiaoping decided to open up China to 
foreign investment to improve the lives of the Chinese people.  It is not an accident that offshore 
petroleum drilling was the first industry Deng opened to foreign investment.313  Also, the economic 
center shifted away from inland regions towards the coastal regions.  Special Economic Zones were 
opened along the Southeastern coast as centers of investment to lure overseas Chinese business into 
China since most of the overseas Chinese hailed emigrated from Southeastern China.  The original 
Special Economic Zones were intentionally placed near Honk Kong, Macau and Taiwan.   
In 1994 the PLAN would establish a permanent structure on Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands.  
The reef was also claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam.  The Philippines discovered the structure in 
February 1995 after Chinese sailors drove away Filipino fisherman there.  While this occupation was 
gained without force, it is worth noting for the purpose of better understanding the Chinese 
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consolidation of territory.  Preceding this occupation was intense competition between neighboring 
states over the ownership of island features along with drilling rights for energy exploitation.314   
While controlling the South China Sea clearly yields economic benefits for China, it is also of 
great strategic value.  A strong naval presence in the South China Sea is directly related to China’s main 
“core interest,” defending its territorial claim to Taiwan.  China fears that if it has to defend its claim to 
Taiwan, the UN Navy will come to the aid of Taiwan.  China fears that the US Navy might not only 
militarily aid Taiwan, but block Chinese imports from reaching Chinese shores.  To prevent this China 
must control the South China Sea since most of its shipping transverses through the Strait of Malacca 
and the South China Sea.  Chinese Naval plans consist on preventing US access within the First Island 
Chain which runs from the Southern tip of Japan, to Okinawa, to Taiwan and to the Philippines.  To 
prevent foreign access into the First Island Chain, China must be able to control both the South and East 
China Seas, along with the islands within them. 
 Toshi Yoshihara presents and an interesting comparison to understand China’s growing naval 
power claims of a core interest in the South China Sea.  He claims that some in China view the South 
China, East China, and Yellow Seas (known as “the three seas” or “the near seas”) in the same way that 
the 19th-century Americans regarded the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico: essential for domination 
for the United States to realize its political and commercial potential.315  In fact just as Alfred Thayer 
Mahan saw controlling the Gulf essential for building a Central American Isthmus, a vital sea passage to 
the Pacific, today Chinese naval strategists see controlling the South China Sea as key to having a transit 
point through the Strait of Malacca and into the Indian Ocean.  Control of the Gulf, Caribbean and the 
Panama Canal were essential in strengthening America’s political, economic and military might.  
However, China’s situation is much different from 19th-century US.  America was fortunate to have the 
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major world powers be stationed across the Atlantic, while contemporary China lives in a dangerous 
neighborhood with many powers, including the United States. 
 China has gone about strengthening its position in the South China Sea through not only military 
maneuvers but diplomatic maneuvers.  The Chinese diplomatic strategy for engaging in disputes has 
been mostly through bilateral discussions that outsiders have depicted as “salami tactics” or realpolitik.  
China prefers to talk with one country at a time, and not deal with ASEAN as a whole.  While it agrees 
with ASEAN on maintaining the region status-quo, China always seeks to deal with other claimant states 
bilaterally and pre-empt third party intervention.316  This may be due to the memory of the century of 
humiliation.  Working with all states in a collective forum would only harm China’s interest in controlling 
the entire South China Sea because all other claimant states share a common fear of Chinese 
expansionism and bullying.  While engaging in bilateral talks, China has yet to ever cooperate on island 
disputes with the exception of Mao’s transfer of White Dragon Tail Island in 1957.  China prefers to 
delay all settlements with the belief that time will only strengthen China’s position as the People’s 
Republic of China grows stronger economically, politically and militarily.  Deng’s famous maxim, “hide 
our capacities and bide our time,” rings true here.  China wants to build its strength and wait until it can 
enforce its position on East Asia: moving too assertively can undermine the Chinese position.   
 In 1988 China upgraded the territory of Hainan to provincial status and assigned all islets, reefs, 
and atolls it claimed in the South China Sea under Hainan’s administrative order with the hope of 
reinforcing its territorial claims.317  Recently Hainan enacted a regulation that non-Chinese fishing 
vessels wanting to operate in the South China Sea must obtain permission from China’s central 
government.318  The rule took place on 1 January 2014 and it remains to be seen how enforcement will 
take place.  Scholars and diplomats suggest that enforcement, for now, will be limited to the sea 
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surrounding the Paracel Islands.319  These islands are closer to Hainan than the Spratlys, and China has a 
presence there.  Hainan is a key player in Beijing’s South China Sea strategy not only for its 
administrative functions that provide legal justification for Chinese behavior, but because it holds a key 
Naval base. 
 China is also locked in a dispute over the Senkaku Islands with Japan.  On February 19, 2014 US 
Naval intelligence analysts released a report stating they believed China was preparing for a “short, 
sharp war” with Japan over the Senkaku Islands.  Susan Shirk explains that China has a difficult time 
handling domestic resentment against Japan because it ignites patriotic feelings among Chinese and 
anger for the atrocities committed by Japan during World War.320  Her chapter on Japan is entitled 
“Japan: ‘When the Chinese People Get Angry the Result is Always Big Trouble.’”321  The Chinese media 
and public are especially sensitive to the legacy of Japanese atrocities committed in World War II, the 
lack of coverage in Japanese textbooks for its wartime atrocities, and Japanese leader visits to the 
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo that honors Japanese war dead (including war criminals).  This is especially 
worrisome to China.  This past summer on a key anniversary (August 15, 2013) Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe and his top officials listened to the advice of Chinese, American and South Korean leaders 
and avoided visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.322  While he did not go 175,000 people went; an increase from 
161,000 which some link to territorial tensions with China.323  However, much to the dismay of China, on 
December 26, 2013 he visited the Yasukuni Shrine. 
China’s hatred of Japan is burdened by history and its humiliating defeats in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895 and the Anti-Japanese War of 1931-1945.  The Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the Sino-
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Japanese War and China gave Taiwan to Japan and lost its control of independent Korea to Japan.324  
Japan would immediately make Taiwan a colony and Korea in 1910.  The colony of Korea would provide 
the basis of Japan’s invasion into Manchuria and China.  The negotiator of this treaty, Li Hongzhang, has 
gone down in infamy and his name is used as insults to accuse people as being traitors to their 
country.325  However he has recently been acknowledged for his skill in ending the rivalry and pitting 
Russia against Japan in Manchuria (which would lead to the Russo-Japanese War in 1904) but China is 
still hostile about his concessions of Chinese land to foreigners.326 
Today’s territorial tension is directly linked to the Treaty of Shimonoseki and concerns the 
islands referred to as Senkaku in Japan and Diaoyu in China.  The islands are roughly 120 nm northeast 
of Taiwan and 240 nm southwest of Okinawa.327  In 1895 Japan believed these islands were ceded to 
them in the treaty along with Taiwan and Korea.  Japan would control the islands until the end of World 
War II, and then the United States administered them until they were returned to Japan in 1972.328  
China believes these islands have historically been China’s and linked to Taiwan.  Dispute over 
sovereignty only arouse in 1969 when Japanese geologist discovered an underwater oil field which was 
believed to be one of the ten largest in the world.329  In this dispute China has consistently chose to 
delay achieving a settlement.  During negotiations for a 1978 Peace Treaty both sides discussed the 
islands only to decide to exclude it from the agreement.330  Concerning the issue Deng Xiaoping said: “It 
doesn’t matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years.  Our generation is not wise 
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enough to find common language on this question.  Our next generation will certainly be wiser.  They 
will certainly find a solution acceptable to all.”331  These islands have military and economic significance 
that naturally make them desirable and the tension is compounded by history, pride, patriotism and 
great power rivalry. 
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also important to China for its defense of Taiwan.  Control over 
the islands builds a buffer outside Taiwan and prevents rival Japan from controlling territory close to 
Taiwan.  Also, the islands lie within the First Island Chain which China perceives as its imaginary defense 
line it needs to be able to defend in the event of foreign assistance over a Taiwanese conflict.  China 
looks to enforce its first-island chain policy by land, air and sea and recently claimed a no-fly zone over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  On November 23, 2013 China claimed the air over these islands as an “air 
defense zone.”  This has caused a renewed tension between Sino-Japanese relations and also involves 
the military of the United States.  On Monday November 25, 2013, the United States intentionally flew 
B-52s over the “air-defense zone” in response to China’s claim.  However the United States claims the 
mission was planned long in advance of China claiming it an “air-defense zone.” 
Both the South and East China Seas are potential flashpoints for conflict.  China will enjoy 
economic and military benefits if they control the seas.  The economic benefits are worth noting 
because the CCP’s legitimacy is linked to increasing the economic power of China and there plenty of 
natural resources surrounding the islands in contention.  The military benefits are important to China 
because control of these seas improve China’s ability to consolidate its control over Taiwan.  Based on 
the previous uses of force by China, it is likely that China would initiate conflict through the use 
preemptive deterrence, or offensive deterrence if it feels that war is inevitable.  Until the day arrives, if 
it does, China will seek to negotiate bilaterally with states.  However, China will likely try to delay 
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reaching a settlement under the assumption that time is on China’s side.  While both areas are potential 
flashpoints, conflict is more likely to break out over the Senkaku Islands because of China’s bitter rivalry 





The People’s Republic of China’s behavior towards consolidation and especially the 
consolidation of its borders has many factors: The Qing Dynasty’s expansion of China’s borders into non-
ethnic Chinese territory; the memory of the loss of Chinese territory through “unequal treaties” during 
the century of humiliation; Chinese nationalism’s desire to create a state led by the ethnic-Han with its 
borders at the maximum extent of Qing governance; the CCP’s current legitimacy, based upon economic 
improvement; and the unfinished Civil War that has left Taiwan separated from the mainland.  China’s 
behavior towards all regions is assertive, not aggressive or expansionistic, and reflective of the desire to 
reunify Taiwan with the mainland.  Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland represents a 
fragmented, disunited China that in Beijing’s mind must change.  Thus Chinese consolidation policy 
towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the disputes in the islands within the South and 
East China Seas are all driven in part by the need to reunify Taiwan with the mainland.   
After examining China’s territorial consolidation, where can we place the borders of China?  The 
answer to that question is directly related with understanding what it means to be Chinese.  This is not 
an easy task.  It should, however, be apparent that being Chinese is not as simple as being a citizen of 
the PRC, nor a resident on the territory claimed by China.  Clearly the most important aspect of Chinese 
identity is the written Chinese language.  China’s struggle to incorporate Uyghurs and Tibetans into 
Chinese culture reflects this.  Regardless of the dialect spoken, inclusion into Chinese identity involves 
speaking one of the Chinese dialects.  After all it is the direct descendent of the writing system used by 
the Shang Dynasty (1600-1046 BC).332  Furthermore the use of characters instead of an alphabet makes 
it distinctly different from other languages.  In China, language may be more an element of culture than 
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any other culture.  Chinese take a tremendous amount of pride in their language and are always in awe 
of foreigners attempting to learn it.  Language is not only a method of communication but central to 
Chinese identity and expression of culture.   
Chinese identity is also obviously related to the Han ethnicity.  Chinese nationalism is directly 
connected to Han chauvinism and it would not be wrong to categorize Chinese nationalism as a tad 
racist.  Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary Alliance fought to overthrow the foreign-Manchu Qing, 
and restore “Chinese” rule to China.  Even though Manchuria is within the contemporary boundaries of 
the PRC, it was considered foreign because the Manchus are not Han Chinese.  That racism lives today as 
Chinese leaders constantly chastise expressions of other identities and cultures.  In Beijing’s eyes, being 
Uyghur or Tibetan means one is not Chinese, and threatens the unity of the state.   
History and geography also constitute important aspects of Chinese identity.  Chinese trace the 
beginning of their civilization to the legendary Yellow Emperor who ruled in the third millennium BC.  
China itself traces its initial unification as a political state to 221 BC under the Qin Dynasty.  It can be 
argued that no existing country traces its history continuously that far back.  Successive generations 
spread from the yellow river valley, the cradle of Chinese civilization, outward as the Chinese people 
spread.  They spread south and east towards the seas where the heart of the population lives, much 
more than they spread west.  Chinese states typically held its capitals in the east and viewed the far 
west, contemporary Xinjiang, to be nothing but mountains and desert.  The core parts always faced 
eastward and held its back on the middle part of the Eurasian continent.333  China’s traditional view of 
its western expanse is evident in that Xi’an was the beginning or end of the Silk Road connecting Central 
Asia to China.  The Chinese political state’s expansion of the border westward and incorporation of Tibet 
and Xinjiang is the direct result of the expansionistic Qing Empire.   
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Defining Chinese identity along lines of Han ethnicity, Chinese language, Confucian culture, 
dynastic history and geography helps us determine the borders of China.  These are no means strict, 
absolute definitions for Chinese identity, but it provides a tremendous amount of insight into the core of 
the Chinese nation.  Thus when defining the borders of the Chinese nation several conclusions can be 
drawn: First it is very difficult to include the debates over sovereignty of the offshore islands in this 
discussion because it is not inhabited by people and it is impossible to determine who rightfully deserves 
sovereignty over the islands.  Second, Tibet clearly should be considered outside the borders of China.  
Tibetans do not want to be Chinese; they wish to retain their own identity as Tibetans which for the 
most part this includes being Tibetan Buddhist.  Tibetans speak a different language and have a different 
history.  While China is bonded by its dynastic history, Tibetans were bonded by the subservience to the 
Dalai Lama who has been the political and spiritual leader for Tibetans since the 15th century.  Since the 
fifth Dalai Lama, the Dalai Lamas have often acted as the political leader of a unified Tibet.  Following 
the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Tibetan nationalism helped stir the creation of a de facto independent 
Tibetan stat under the thirteenth Dalai Lama.  China has been able to consolidate its sovereignty over 
Tibet but met with resistance.  
Despite China’s success at consolidating Tibet by force, it has faced a tremendous amount of 
difficulty winning over the will of the people.  While all political geography is consolidated by force 
governments cannot maintain control over said territory with force.  Such is the case in Tibet where 
Tibetans have not been assimilated into the Chinese culture.  In fact it seems that China’s attempt to 
consolidate its authority in Tibet as only further distanced Tibetans from the Chinese state.  Instead of 
destroying nationalism, China’s policies have increased Tibetan nationalism and a sense of Tibetan 
identity.  Since the 1959 uprising Tibetans have continued to demonstrate against the PRC authority and 
look to the exiled fourteenth Dalai Lama as the leader of the Tibetan people.  The CCP has vilified him, 
labeled him a “wolf in monk’s robe,” and looks to the Dalai Lama as the leader of Tibetan separatism.  
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The Dalai Lama’s internationalization of the Tibetan issue has successfully brought the Tibetan cause for 
independence into the consciousness of the international community.  Human rights groups and 
western governments wish to see a freer Tibet that is less constrained by Chinese control.  Although the 
Dalai Lama has mostly been able to keep the protests for Tibetan freedoms non-violent, it remains to be 
seen what will happen when after he passes.  If China insists upon appointing his successor, or 
abolishing the position they could an increase in Chinese nationalism and make it more difficult to 
consolidate Tibet.   
Like Tibet, Xinjiang’s incorporation into China is the result of the Qing Dynasty’s western 
expansion and the PRC’s desire to proclaim their borders at the maximal extent of Qing governance.  
The case in Xinjiang is different from the Tibet Autonomous Region.  Unlike Tibet, Han Chinese are 
moving into Xinjiang.  Tibet still contains a 92% Tibetan majority and has not fallen victim to Han 
migration.  Xinjiang, however, is a territory ethnically divided and since 1949 has become more Chinese.  
As of the 2000 National Population Census the territory is divided ethnically with 40% Han, and 45% 
Uyghur.  Population estimates vary in terms of ethnic breakdown and total population but there seems 
to be a total of over 21 million people with a rough 45:40 breakdown of Uyghur vis-à-vis Han.  This is 
remarkably different from the ethnic breakdown in 1945 that featured a population of 3.6 million 
people with an 82.7% Uyghur Majority and 6.2% Han Minority.334  Since the PRC has consolidated its rule 
over Xinjiang, the “new frontier,” has become more Chinese.  The population demographic center has 
also shifted northward, away from the southwestern section of the province, because the of the Han 
concentration in the northern urban centers of Xinjiang – Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi.  However much 
of the southwestern section is still populated by an Uyghur majority.  Although Xinjiang has fallen victim 
to Sinicization, it does not mean that the entire populous wishes it to become such, rather since 1990 
Xinjiang has been the source of tremendous interethnic tension that has erupted into violence at times.  
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Xinjiang is a region divided.  The tension in Xinjiang is only getting worse but still lacks unified 
leadership.  The Uyghurs are growing further disenchanted from the Chinese state and will continue to 
use violence to voice their frustration.  Due to the difficulty to smuggle weapons into the region 
separatist Uyghurs are doing whatever they can to attack China.  Most recently, on March 1, 2014 
Uyghur separatists launched a knife-wielding attack at a railway station in the Chinese city of Kunming, 
Yunnan, which left 29 civilians dead.  China will continue to face difficulty in consolidating Xinjiang as the 
separatist sentiment rises. 
Hong Kong and Macau are most certainly part of the Chinese nation.  They are within the 
traditional Chinese homeland and contain substantial Han majorities.  While the people of Hong Kong 
certainly have their own identity it is not one that is threatening to Beijing with separatist occupation.  
The people of Hong Kong wish to keep their personal freedoms and their ability to make money.  It 
would be wrong to categorize Hong Kong as not Chinese on the basis of a different economic and 
political model without CCP administration.  Due to the findings that being is ethnically and linguistically 
determined; they must be placed within the borders of China.  
Taiwan is an entirely different story.  Valid arguments can be made for Taiwan being part of the 
Chinese nation and equally valid arguments can argue that Taiwan is its own distinct nation of 
Taiwanese.  Taiwan is culturally and historically tied to the mainland, politically moving away from 
Beijing, while economically being pulled towards the mainland.  The people living on the island of 
Taiwan are torn about the issue of independence or reunification, and torn on whether or not they are 
Chinese.  It could be also argued that Taiwan is more “Chinese” than the mainland due to its 98% Han 
majority in comparison to the 91.5% Han majority in the PRC.  It is likely that the Taiwan issue would be 
a non-issue if it were not for the Korean War.  Were it not for the insertion of a US aircraft into the 
strait, Mao Zedong would have been able to seize Taiwan and incorporate CCP rule. 
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By no means should there be definitive lines drawn around this “China” we speak of, but a 
rough outline of the borders should include Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and most of Xinjiang.  When 
defining China along ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historic and geographic lines, Tibet simply cannot be 
considered part of China.  China is in my eyes what it always was: the geographic spread of ethnic Han 
peoples speaking Chinese dialects outward from the Yellow River valley.  However instead of dynastic 
emperors attempting to consolidate control over the territory these people live in, it is the CCP.  Lucian 
Pye’s assertion that China was a civilization pretending to be a nation-state still rings true.  It will be 
interesting to see how this state changes over time.  Beijing will continue to face ethnic unrest in Tibet 
and Xinjiang as long Chinese administer these territories.  In both cases China’s own policies seem to 
further ignite nationalistic sentiment amongst the Uyghurs and Tibetans.  However it would be ignorant 
to think Beijing would easily, if ever relinquish its claims to these western territories.  Xinjiang is simply 
too important for its multitude of natural resources, its stock of Chinese nuclear weapons, its connection 
to Central Asia through a modern day Silk Road, and its tremendous Han presence.  Tibet also has 
natural resources that Beijing wishes to exploit, though not as much as Xinjiang. 
The CCP’s current legitimacy to rule is based mainly upon its success at increasing the standard 
of living of Chinese.  They have done an excellent job increasing China’s wealth: In 2012 China had a GDP 
of $8230 Billion compared to $1200 Billion in 2000, and a GDP per capita of $3,348 per capita as 
opposed to the $1,122 per capita in 2000.335  According to Bruce Gilley’s 2006 study the PRC ranked 13th 
internationally in legitimacy (Taiwan was 12th) ahead of other notable countries such as Britain, Japan, 
South Korea and France.336  Anne-Marie Brady asserts that the CCP administers China through popular 
authoritarianism in which the CCP bases its legitimacy on economic growth and its emphasis on 




 Gilley, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445036?seq=17, based upon several criteria Gilley came to the 
conclusion that “good governance, democratic rights, and welfare gains provide the most reasonable and robust 
determinants of legitimacy.” 
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persuading the Chinese people that the CCP is accomplishing this.337  Through her research she found 
that the majority of Chinese accept this system even though many disapprove certain aspects of their 
governance.338  One Chinese professor I interviewed stated that the government had done a 
tremendous amount for its citizens over the past decade, but still had much work to be done.  The CCP’s 
goal of legitimizing its rule through economic improvement will continue to drive the tension in Xinjiang: 
Han Chinese will continue to get rich while the Uyghurs do not, and Uyghurs will continue to get 
frustrated by the Han migration and Chinese resource exploitation.  Furthermore the CCP’s goal of 
legitimizing its rule though economic improvement makes the resources in the South and East China Sea 
more desirable and drives Chinese policy towards consolidating the offshore islands. 
It will be interesting to see if China’s attempt to consolidate Taiwan brings about domestic 
political changes on the mainland.  Democracy is succeeding in Taiwan and valued as part of the 
Taiwanese way of life.  Part of the fear of reunification with the mainland is that Taiwan would lose their 
democratic institutions.  In order to peacefully complete reunification, the PRC will likely have to allow 
democracy to flourish on Taiwan.  Hong Kong also features aspects of democratic institutions.  It will be 
interesting to watch if the Chinese attempt to consolidate these two territories brings about some form 
of democracy on the mainland.   
It would be wrong to depict Chinese nationalism as aggressive simply because it is struggling to 
consolidate its territorial claims.  While China is by no means an advocate for self-determination, their 
consolidation behavior is assertive in attempting to maintain the territorial integrity of what they believe 
is rightfully China and afraid of it becoming fragmented.  The best model for understanding assertive 
Chinese nationalism may come from the use of the rattlesnake in America’s early history.  In 1754 
Benjamin Franklin printed the famous “Join or Die” political cartoon (first in American history) showing a 
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snake divided into eight-parts, with each part symbolizing a region of the American colonies.  The 
purpose was to illustrate the disunited state of the colonies and to emphasize the need to come 
together and aid the British in the French-Indian War.  The cartoon would then take on its role as an 
expression of colonial patriotic fever leading up to the American Revolution.  Benjamin Franklin 
explained his decision to use the rattlesnake as follows: 
I recollected that her eye excelled in brightness, that of any other animal, and that she 
has no eye-lids. She may therefore be esteemed an emblem of vigilance. She never 
begins an attack, nor, when once engaged, ever surrenders: She is therefore an emblem 
of magnanimity and true courage. As if anxious to prevent all pretensions of quarreling 
with her, the weapons with which nature has furnished her, she conceals in the roof of 
her mouth, so that, to those who are unacquainted with her, she appears to be a most 
defenseless animal; and even when those weapons are shown and extended for her 
defense, they appear weak and contemptible; but their wounds however small, are 
decisive and fatal. Conscious of this, she never wounds 'till she has generously given 
notice, even to her enemy, and cautioned him against the danger of treading on her.339 
In 1775 the rattlesnake would again be used by Christopher Gadsden, the American statesman and 
eventual Brigadier General in the Continental Army, when he designed the “Gadsden Flag” that depicted 
the rattlesnake coiled and ready to strike with the words “Don’t Tread on Me” underneath. 
 This rattlesnake correctly embodies the assertive nationalism within the PRC.  China still 
exemplifies the “Join or Die,” concept when referring to Taiwan reunification.  All parts of the snake 
have joined the PRC except Taiwan.  And the snake’s policy regarding the unity of China is really that 
black-and-white; there is no option for part of the snake to function independently.  Taiwan must join to 
complete the snake, and Xinjiang and Tibet cannot separate from the snake for fear of the snake’s 
death.  China’s behavior towards foreign states is perfectly articulated by the Gadsden Flag snake.  To 
tread can be defined as “to step or walk on or over.”340   China despises foreign “treading” on internal 
Chinese affairs, especially foreigners who attempt to tread on Chinese territory.  Like a rattlesnake, 
China strikes first, yet not without rattling a warning to not tread on its territory.  In October 1950 Zhou 
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Enlai issued a warning to the Indian ambassador to Peking that if UN forces crossed the Yalu River, China 
would intervene.  Sure enough UN forces under General MacArthur crossed the Yalu River, prompting 
the PLA to cross into North Korea and launch its war with America.  The PRC would launch attacks 
against India, USSR and Vietnam in response to an increase military presence on its borders.   
The Chinese policies consolidation policies towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and the 
neighboring seas are by no means only isolated, regional-specialized policies.  Everything converges on 
Taiwan.  China is still fragmented and Taiwan must be united with the mainland.  In Xinjiang and Tibet 
China assertively fights separatism out of a fear that territorial loss will weaken China’s claim to Taiwan.  
If China was to allow either autonomous region to secede from the PRC, it would allow Taiwan to do the 
same.   Domino theory is part of this grand-strategy towards Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan because if China 
allows one of the regions to be free, it is believed the other regions would demand the same.  China had 
to stay assertive in its negotiations with England over the return of Hong Kong otherwise its claim to 
Taiwan would not be taken seriously.  With Hong Kong and Macau’s return to China, Beijing has offered 
them the ability to function as a special administrative region (Hong Kong’s time as a Special 
Administrative Region expires in 2047, Macau’s in 2049) in the hopes that Taiwan would seek to reunify 
under the same system.  China’s policies towards the South and East China Seas are also driven in part 
by the goal of reunification with Taiwan: control of the seas around Taiwan allows China to consolidate 
Taiwan by force if need be.   
For China, a cohesive territorial consolidation policy demands strong leadership.  Xi Jinping has 
succeeded Hu Jintao to preside over China’s fifth generation of leadership.341   On November 15, 2012 
he assumed office General Secretary of the Central Committee the Chinese Communist Party; on March 
14, 2013 he assumed office as the President of the People’s Republic of China and Chairman of the 
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People’s Republic of China Central Military Commission.  This has allowed him to function as head of the 
party, the government and the military.  On January 25, 2014 he also assumed leadership as the 
Chairman of the newly created National Security Commission.  This commission will be structured 
similar to the US National Security Council but with a stronger focus on domestic security that combines 
foreign and domestic policy.342  As Chairman, Xi Jinping will be able to now conduct foreign and 
domestic defense policy with less interference from the seven-member Politburo Standing 
Committee.343  This position gives Xi Jinping more power and influence than the two previous leaders of 
China Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.  It will make Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping.  
Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin University stated that the move “makes it 
look like Xi Jinping is almost all powerful.  He’ll have more power than previous leaders to conduct 
foreign policy and security affairs.”344  Certainly this position cements Xi’s power and enables him to 
control China’s policy towards territorial consolidation.   
Many in the international community fear China’s territorial ambitions.  China’s potential to use 
force to consolidate its longstanding claim to Taiwan or its current dispute with neighbors regarding the 
offshore islands in the South and East China Seas certainly demands attention.  China’s rising military 
expenditures, especially into its Navy, also demands attention.  However this study finds that China is 
not aggressively seeking to use force, but fully preparing itself to be able to assert itself if it need me.  If 
China decides it needs to assert itself it will initiate the conflict through the use of offensive deterrence.  
China’s behavior towards Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau also demand attention as China 
continues to fight separatism and commit human rights abuses.  To quote Shakespeare, “madness in 
great ones must not unwatched go.”345  China, like Hamlet, must be watched because it has the strong 
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potential to do so and the assertive mindset to follow through.  The international community must 
always be vigilant when watching China’s return as a dominant power in East Asia. 
This thesis constituted an attempt to understand China’s territorial consolidation and its 
implications.  It finds that the Qing’s dynasty’s expansion; the memory of territorial loss during the 
century of humiliation; Chinese nationalism desire to create a unified state led by ethnic Han’s with its 
borders at the maximum extent of Qing governance; the CCP’s legitimacy, being based upon economic 
improvement; and the Taiwan’s continual separation from the mainland drive China’s behavior towards 
territorial consolidation.  For further study I would recommend several topics.  First, will China’s attempt 
to consolidate its control over Hong Kong and Taiwan lead to some form of democracy on the mainland?  
Taiwan clearly values its democratic systems and I believe the China has to offer some democracy on the 
mainland to incentivize Taiwan to reunify with the mainland.  It would be interesting to study the 
prospects for democracy within China and relate it to reunification.  Second, would be a study on PRC’s 
policy towards overseas Chinese.  I believe that being Chinese has a lot to do with ethnicity and 
language, so it would be interesting to understand how Beijing treats those who live inside the PRC 
different from inside the PRC.  Furthermore because this study involves the borders of China, would 
China seek to annex territory just across its borders as some Chinese people move settle in other 
countries.  I would think not, but part of the reason China invaded Vietnam in 1979 was over the 
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